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IF Germany now reverses her submarine policy, we need not ascribe the change to any repentance or conviction of sin. Nations at war do not incline to sackcloth and ashes, and the German people to-day are doubtless as fully convinced of their moral justification in sinking the Lusitania as they were in the month of May. Prudential considerations alone must have dictated the German turnabout. What these considerations are, however, we cannot surely know. Perhaps Germany at last realizes that in a war with us she would lose more than she would gain by sinking a dozen Arabics. Or her people may be so elated over the Russian victories that a diplomatic retreat before the United States will not arouse much antagonism. Or perhaps her submarine policy, as Captain Perseus intimates, is now recognized as a failure, and Germany may choose to surrender to American representations rather than let the submarine campaign fizzle out. Finally, Germany may be giving in because the Balkan situation has become decisive. It may not be flattering to America to be humored because of the possible influence her action might have upon Rumania and Greece. But we need not concern ourselves with causes so long as we obtain results. The one outstanding fact remains that unless all reports from Berlin are false, a grave and dangerous controversy will be terminated by Germany rendering to the United States "complete satisfaction."

THE phrase "complete satisfaction" has a most pleasing sound, but everything depends upon what it means. In view of Germany's more conciliatory attitude we are now justified in demanding more than that which would have contented us several months ago. We do not want a recurrence of the controversy. May our government, therefore, not insist upon disavowal, reparation, a guarantee against future attacks, and, as an earnest of good faith, the punishment of the offending submarine commander? But the last of these demands is one which might seriously embarrass the German government. Why should the courageous submarine commander be punished for doing what other commanders had done — and even been rewarded for doing—especially if, as is rumored, the new orders, which he is supposed to have disobeyed, never reached him, but were intentionally held up by the German Admiralty? It would be difficult to punish the commander and equally difficult not to punish him. If, however, as is reported, the submarine which destroyed the Arabic, has itself been destroyed with all hands on board, the German government escapes from the dilemma, and a satisfactory solution becomes more probable.

DURING the past few days the opponents of the short ballot have been forced to unmask and disclose the naked ugliness of their real interests. When it was originally proposed to make only the governor and the lieutenant-governor elective and let the governor appoint the five minor state executive officials the opposition was very much distressed at the danger to free institutions which would result from such a concentration of power. It was insisted that the people be protected from executive usurpation by keeping the chief law-officer of the state and the head of its auditing department elec-

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tive. The committee wisely or unwisely yielded to this demand, but they took from the comptroller the work of tax collecting, which brings with it a rich fund of patronage, and made him what in theory he ought to be, exclusively an auditor. But the opposition was not placated. It objected violently to this method of protecting the state against executive usurpation. So the committee shifted their ground. Believing it important that the comptroller should not audit his own extensive administrative work, they proposed an appointive auditor, dependent on the governor but with meagre patronage, and an elective comptroller with patronage to burn. "Perfectly satisfactory," says Comptroller Travis, and the Barnes-Tammany opposition, to whom only a few weeks before an independent audit had been the bulwark of free institutions.

THE Republican leaders at Albany have been severely criticized for compromising with the opponents of the short ballot; but we are not disposed at present to acquiesce in this criticism. Its justification will be measured by the ultimate success of the Convention's work. Such compromises may be necessary to allay opposition not in the Convention but at the polls. The new constitution, no matter how enthusiastically it may be approved by the newspapers and by disinterested critics of American government, will not have an easy victory with the voters. Again and again they have shown themselves jealous of their power, and reluctant to abandon any phase of its exercise. If there were added to the reluctance of the voters and their indisposition at present to accept new proposals, the determined opposition of the two party machines, the reformed constitution might very well fail to obtain a preponderant vote. The difficulty is that no adequate attempt has ever been made to dramatize the short ballot and executive leadership for the popular imagination; and the time between the completion of the work of the Convention and the election will not be long enough to repair the deficiency. The friends of the short ballot are not so strong in their hold on popular opinion that they can take success at the polls for granted. If the new constitution should be accepted by only a small majority of the voters, the wisdom of the compromises would be established.

SO far as we know, ex-Senator Root is the first American political leader to make an emotionally effective appeal for a regenerated state government. In his fine stirring speech of last week he did not exaggerate the importance of the work which he and his associates are trying to accomplish. They are working to eradicate a disease which has been steadily transforming the American local democracies into pieces of organized incompetence and hypocrisy. In his speech Mr. Root dwelt eloquently and effectively upon the dangers which threaten the state from a perpetuation of the irresponsible and irresponsive party government of the past. We trust that before long some public speaker will enlarge no less movingly upon the opportunity for positive social achievement, which the people of the state will derive from a regenerated state government. The new machinery cannot do away with the existing evils unless it becomes a positive power for good, and it cannot become a sufficiently positive power for good unless it makes the realization of social purposes by collective action the agency of arousing and educating public opinion. Some day a political leader will be developed who will make the American people thrill in response to his account of the opportunities for a finer associated life which will result from the concentration of state government and the official organization of majority rule.

WHAT might be designated a quiet Saturday in Bridgeport is described in a dispatch to a New York newspaper beginning: "Labor conditions in many Bridgeport industrial plants to-day remained practically unchanged from yesterday." Count that day lost. The only disturbances of the drowsy Connecticut calm were the granting of an eight-hour day to 2,000 employees of a brass company; the closing of a textile mill pending discussion with 1,600 workers upon the eight-hour day and improvement in shop conditions; the shut-down of a screw factory; the walkout of the remaining employees of a laundry company who demanded the closed shop in addition to the eight-hour day already granted; announcements of conferences in two corset factories and of a mass meeting of victorious girl strikers in a third. That was all—except the demand of 600 electrical workers on strike for an eight-hour day and a flat increase of twenty-five cents. The apparent lack of progress was probably due to a week-end lull rather than to Mayor Wilson's assertion that this agitation is harmful to the fair name of Bridgeport as tending to keep away applicants for employment.

IT looks as if we should have to depend during the coming winter upon ex-President Roosevelt to make political controversy interesting. He is the only political leader, except those actually responsible for the conduct of the government, who has throughout the crisis superinduced by the war trod a definite and unmistakable path of his own. On this as on so many previous occasions he has exhibited a passion and a gift for leadership—a gift which is rendered the more conspicuous because of the almost complete lack of competition. The Republicans, progressives and conservatives alike, have been dumb. The twelve or fifteen candidates

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for the Presidency in that party have been proving their fitness for the office by carefully refraining from giving to the American nation any direction or advice in its hour of perplexity and need. They neither knew enough nor dared enough. Democrats and Progressives have been equally reticent and retiring—although with better excuse. Mr. Roosevelt alone has had the courage to associate his own personality in the eyes of the American people with a policy which provides and prepares for increasing American international responsibilities. He has once more proved his unique ability to make the waters of the American public opinion boil and hum and splutter. There is a terrific noise and a great deal of blinding steam; but people who don't like the hullabaloo should remember that some kind of a pudding is really being cooked.

MR. ROOSEVELT may be too much of an agitator. He provokes a great deal of unnecessary opposition by his methods of controversy —by intemperance of language, by inability to be fair to opponents and by an ungenerous disposition to fasten on them the stigma of unrighteousness. The many admirable causes with which his public life has been associated have all been injured by the enmities which he has provoked almost as much as they have been helped by the loyalty which he has inspired. But if Mr. Roosevelt is too much of an agitator, Mr. Wilson is certainly not enough of one. Although the ability to write and speak have played such a peculiarly important part in the President's career, he does not use his power of utterance as it should be used in the government of a democracy. He uses it to proclaim decisions which have already been taken, but he does not use it to prepare public opinion for desirable innovations. His speeches and letters are not the bill-boards and advance agents of a performance which is expected to ring up at some future date. They are rather the prologue and somewhat even the dialogue of the play itself. People do not know enough about the play until the chief performer makes his bow and opens his mouth to the audience. We sympathize with the man who recently said that he has had to spend too much of his energy recently in wishing that Mr. Roosevelt would be more discreet and Mr. Wilson less so.

NOW that the protests which the government of the United States has been making against the violation of international law perpetrated by both Germany and Great Britain seem to be having some effect, the attitude of an influential section of American public opinion towards these protests is worth recalling. Many very intelligent and public spirited people have continually urged that the rights of American citizens under international law should be abandoned or at least waived, that Americans should, for instance, be officially warned against traveling to and from Europe on English ships. These people wholly failed to understand that the rights of neutrals under the law of nations were just as plainly the beginnings of a constitutional international system as the charters of municipal rights granted by feudal lords were the beginning of domestic constitutionalism. Existing rights were far from being sufficient, but they were both substantial and symbolic. The most effective way in which this country officially could testify in favor of a pacifist international organization was to insist upon the integrity of law against armed lawlessness from any source. Respect for some kind of public law, belief in its value, and willingness if necessary to fight for its maintenance, must lie at the foundation of any worthy and enduring international structure.

THE law of visit and search, which so many Americans would have consented to abandon because of the danger and cost of insisting on it, is an essential part of the whole system of neutral rights. International law permits a belligerent warvessel to capture, and in case of necessity to sink, not only the enemy's merchantmen but also neutral merchantmen which are discovered to be carrying contraband. If German submarines are free to sink vessels on the mere assumption that they are enemy's property, without first making proper visit and search, what is to hinder them from sinking neutral vessels on the mere assumption that they are carrying contraband. Again, what of the neutral property which is aboard enemy merchantmen sunk by German submarines? It is a reasonable deduction from the Declaration of Paris that when this property is not contraband, its neutral owners are entitled to compensation for their loss. At any rate they are certainly entitled not to be exposed to loss by the failure of belligerents to conform to the law. In short, if we had broken with Germany it would not be simply for the right of American citizens to take passage on the ships of Germany's enemies, but to arrest at the threshold a course of lawlessness that might otherwise become incalculably destructive.

ONE of the serious problems to be faced by the next Congress will be that of increasing the federal revenues. Even if the war should come to an early close the customs revenues, under existing tariff rates, will hardly be sufficient to overcome the accumulating deficit of the last year. Nor will the party in power consent to revise the tariff upward, even if such a measure were certain to yield revenue abundantly—something not at all to be taken for

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granted. Accordingly it is safe to predict that an effort will be made to increase the productiveness of the various sources of internal revenue, notably the income tax. The income tax of the United Kingdom yielded in 1913-14 over £47,000,000. Our income tax yield for the last fiscal year was $41,000,000—less than one-fifth of the British yield, although our aggregate of private incomes must be very nearly twice that of the United Kingdom. The difference is to be explained chiefly by the higher exemption limit in the United States—$3000 and $4000, as compared with £160—and by our much lower rates on modest incomes, and somewhat lower rates on large incomes. The heaviest rate we collect is seven per cent on the excess of income above $500,000, while the British law even in time of peace exacted seven and one-half per cent from all incomes above £5000. There appears to be no good reason why we should not increase the income tax rates throughout. Translated into the terms of the more familiar property tax, even a ten per cent income tax is only fifty cents on the hundred dollars of capital value. Many a rural community has accepted an addition of fifty cents on the hundred dollars without great murmur. It would further be desirable to lower the exemption limit to $2000. Any income above $2000 is a privileged income in a country where adult male wage earners do not receive $650 a year, on the average.

THE dogma of the superiority of private over public insurance methods is seriously shaken by the report of the New York State Insurance Department on the operations of the insurance fund for the year ending June 30. Charging rates twenty per cent lower than those of private casualty companies, the state fund has none the less been able to return to the policyholders very substantial dividends, averaging nearly twenty per cent for the first six months of the year, and fifteen per cent for the second six months, although rates for the latter period had undergone an additional cut of twelve per cent. Besides, the fund accumulated a loss reserve of $621,883 and a catastrophe surplus of $109,111. Under the regulations of the Department, private companies are allowed 33.3 per cent of rates to cover expenses. The expense ratio of the Department for the twelve months was seventeen per cent of the premiums earned. The Department has, however, learned how to cut expenses, and is now operating on twelve per cent of earned premiums. It is worth noting that this record of efficiency is published without comment by the major part of the press. If the record had been one of excessive premiums, scant dividends and high operating ratio, it would have been accorded a far more noisy reception.

Georgia and the Nation

THE course of legal process in Cobb County, Georgia, since the lynching of Leo Frank has tended to confirm the prediction that the lynchers would never be punished. The investigation conducted by the coroner was a farce. The inquiry did not disclose any facts about the crime, because it was never intended to disclose any facts. Almost everybody in Marietta must have known the names of at least a majority of the lynchers, the full story of the preparations, the dash across the state, and the capture and the execution; but nobody could be made to say a word. The whole community has conspired, if not to break the law, at least to shield the culprits. The state officers will not be any more zealous and efficient in eliciting the names of the criminals and in punishing them than the county officials. They possess neither the power nor the will to execute the laws in defiance of local public opinion. Throughout the whole of this detestable business the state and county officials, with a few honorable exceptions, have joined the mob in declaring that in one way or another, either with or without legal forms, Leo Frank should die. Never in the long and terrible annals of mob violence has there been a clearer case of responsibility for lawless bloodshed incurred by a community in its collective aspect.

Yet if the lynching of Leo Frank is considered merely as an isolated casual instance, brought about by some spasmodic perversion of the popular conscience in Marietta, in Cobb County or in the state of Georgia, we shall be reading too cheap a lesson into what is in reality a far more expensive business. The condemnation of Frank by the Georgian mob, his ruthless execution and the connivance in the crime of the community as a whole is only an exceptionally flagrant example of a kind of authorized lawlessness which flares up now and then all over the Union. The form assumed by the lawlessness varies in different states; and it is of commoner occurrence in some states than in others; but it may happen anywhere, and when it happens it implies, as in Georgia, some measure both of official and popular complicity. The state officials are either unwilling or powerless to execute the laws; and their lack of will and power is not accidental. Executive impotence is provided for in the traditional system of government by law. The American people are confronted with nothing less than the occasional but inexorable breakdown of the authority of their state governments.

Whenever an American community is possessed by an absorbing local interest, a compelling passion or a dominating fear, it is not and cannot be restrained by a feebly administered law from sum-

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marily satisfying its desires or quieting its apprehensions. In Coatesville, Pennsylvania, recently the state officials were unable to prevent the commission of a peculiarly barbarous piece of mob violence. Neither could they secure the conviction of the people responsible for the crime. Only a few years earlier a community in Ohio escaped the consequences of a similar piece of turpitude with no less success. Lynching is not, of course, popular in the North and the East as it is in some other parts of the country; but the northern and eastern states are none the less defenceless against certain kinds of violence. The inability of American state governments in the case of labor disputes to protect either the strikers or the employers against organized disorder is notorious. A complete breakdown of local government has just taken place in Colorado. Illinois, New Jersey, West Virginia, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts have all during comparatively recent times made strikes the occasion of essentially lawless behavior either by or in spite of the state officials. The violence sometimes takes the form of ostensibly legal process, as it did in Georgia, just so far as the law proved to be a serviceable instrument of the mob; it more often ignores the law and defies its representatives; but in both cases the spirit is the same—the spirit of impatient and ruthless action, regardless of the opinions, interests and rights of opponents or of the whole community, and for the most part confident of the impotence, the indifference or connivance of state officials.

The South offers an unusually significant example of authorized American lawlessness, because the problems consequent on the presence of a large negro population have imposed an unusually severe strain on the governments of the southern states. The danger of crimes of violence among the negroes required the organization of local governments which could deal with lawbreakers promptly, vigorously and justly. The case of Jamaica has shown that such a government can keep negro malefaction almost entirely under control. But the southern communities, instead of organizing local governments which could act vigorously and justly, proceeded deliberately to make their governments impotent and the actions of their criminal law dilatory and uncertain. In no part of the country are executive officials so powerless, legislatures so circumscribed, the courts so legalistic, and criminals so likely to escape punishment. The summary methods of Judge Lynch are defended by Southerners on the ground that the punishment for negro aberrations must be swift and sure and terrible; but it could be made equally sure and far more effective by efficient state police and an energetic execution of the criminal laws. The Southerners prefer Judge Lynch because they know that laws which were energetically executed against the negroes by responsible and powerful officials would also have to be executed against the whites. They have cherished the tradition that violent retaliation for personal injuries should be occasionally permitted. While the law condemned homicide, public opinion frequently approved it. They are not averse to using violence against negro criminals because they wish to permit violence among the whites.

This condition in the South is in a deeper sense only an unusually sharp and shameless illustration of a besetting weakness of the American democracy. Our local communities have wished more than anything else to be left alone. They wished freedom to do things in their own way, no matter whether that way was right or wrong. Not, of course, that they attempted to get along without law. On the contrary, they promoted it into a kind of disembodied coadjutor of King Demos. But they wanted on suitable occasion to be able to exempt themselves from the reign of the law. They worked out a system of government in which the law was sovereign, but in which the sovereign was deprived of any dependable means of making his commands effective. The law was supposed to be so efficacious, so impartial and so august that individual men did not need and did not deserve to be entrusted with power to enforce it. The people set up an impersonal king, whom they could unite to worship, but whom they did not have to obey. Responsible officials were denied the power to enforce the law in order that irresponsible men, possessed of some lively and insistent but possibly lawless purpose, might break it with impunity. The American democracy submitted to legalism only because legalism did not forbid a liberal measure of license outside of the law.

Back of the physical violence and lawlessness is an insidious and dangerous moral disorder. The most sinister aspect of contemporary American political life, both in its local and national aspects, consists in the lack of moral unity. Until recently the illegalism which the development of a legalistic political system had brought with it did not result in moral disintegration, because the community was tied together by certain generally accepted moral conventions and by an innocent belief in the excellence of the competitive individualism which the official legalism expressed and encouraged. During the past ten years these traditional bonds have been relaxed. The authority of the prohibitions which made up so much of the traditional morality has been undermined. The faiths and formulas underlying American legalism are being attacked by an increasingly large and uncompromising army of

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dissenters. The dissenters seek to substitute new forms of union for the old, but as yet they have not sufficiently succeeded. The American democracy is in part timidly progressive, in part timidly reactionary and as a whole very much distracted. It needs the impulse and the bondage of a new faith —one which will place the old uniformity of conviction and homogeneity of feeling with a more consciously social ideal and a more efficient equipment both of political and industrial institutions. That social ideal must at least be authoritative and capable. It must create a political system in which such morally obscene incidents as the murder of Leo Frank will be impossible. Instead of paying hypocritical homage to a law which it did not intend to obey except when convenient, the future American democracy must above all be sincere and thorough-going. It cannot afford to place a pretender on a throne in order to have a plausible excuse for escaping now and then from his authority.

Germany's Financial Resources

DISAPPOINTED with the failure of either the central powers or the Allies to make gains promising a conclusive result, the prophets of peace are eagerly scanning the horizon for signs of the financial exhaustion of one party or the other. It appears to be taken for granted that the Allies can outlast the Germans in financial performance. Hence the intense interest in the question, how long will the German treasury hold out? To this interest must be ascribed the space given by the press to the patently apocryphal report of Dr. Helfferich's pessimistic views, and the socialist murmurings.

It is not difficult to prove that the German financial system is still quite solvent. At the outbreak of the war the debt of Germany, including both the Imperial and the state debts, was less than four and a half billion dollars. A very large proportion of this debt was covered by productive assets—railways, telegraph systems, etc.—and is no more to be regarded as a financial burden than are railway stocks and bonds in private hands. A billion and a half is the maximum that can be allowed for the net debts of the German Imperial government and states. Add to this an issue of four billion dollars—a liberal estimate of the amount required to finance the war until January 1, 1916, and we have the huge sum of five and a half billions. England in 1815 bore up under a debt of £861,000,000, or over $4,200,000,000. The population of Great Britain and Ireland in 1815 was considerably less than one-third of that of the German Empire to-day, and the per capita income was probably at least one-third less than that of Germany. There are, to be sure, important points of dissimilarity between the economic situation of early nineteenth century England and that of Germany to-day. It cannot be affirmed dogmatically that Germany can bear so easily a debt of $16,200,000,000 as England in 1815 bore her debt of $4,200,000,000. But the burden of proof is upon those who will assert that Germany cannot stand the financial drain of a war continuing at an annual cost of three billion to four billion dollars until July, 1920.

Historical analogies are often deceptive; let us therefore approach the problem from another angle. It is a commonplace that the actual cost of a war is borne by current production, and that current production sets the ultimate limit of war-waste. So long as the civil population of Germany can feed and clothe itself and has energy enough left over to munition the armies, there is no fundamental economic limit to Germany's belligerency. The financial problem is merely one of adjusting the burden in such a way as not to break the spirit of the civil population and lame its productive activities. But for this psychological element a government might levy taxes at a rate sufficient to defray military expenses as they accrue. Such taxes would divert the surplus of production to military use, and nothing more can be effected by loans. In either case thrift is forced upon the civil population, but through the use of the loan a future reward is offered for present privation.

So long as a government is believed to be solvent the civil population can be induced to put forth its greatest productive efforts and exercise thrift in highest measure through adequate payment in the form of interest-bearing securities. When the solvency of a government is doubtful, such securities will not be accepted voluntarily. The government may force their acceptance, but in such case the line between the loan and the confiscatory tax disappears. Persistence beyond this point leads directly to forced labor and economic disintegration. Now, what we have to determine is, how far Germany is from such a condition. If we assume that the Allies do not succeed in breaking down the frontier defenses of Germany, thus casting doubt upon the very continuity of the Empire, the German civil population will look upon government securities as good tender until their volume becomes so vast that after the return of peace no workable system of taxation will afford revenues sufficient to cover necessary civil and military expenditures and meet the interest on the debt.

Before the outbreak of the war the private incomes of the German Empire amounted to approximately ten billion dollars. The war has no doubt reduced this figure somewhat, and a decade of peace will be required to make any material advance upon

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it. The problem accordingly resolves itself into the following terms: How great a public revenue can be extorted from ten billions of private income, and how much of that revenue is required for purposes other than the service of the debt?

No modern state would find difficulty in levying taxes that take for public purposes fifteen per cent of the private income of its citizens. No state in the world's history has succeeded in taking so much as thirty per cent, and it is very doubtful that even German efficiency could extract a proportion approaching this limit. Apart from the productive revenues of the Imperial government and the states —against which we have already set an appropriate share of the public debt—two billion and a half may be regarded as the maximum amount that can be raised by Empire and states in time of peace. The inevitable current expenditures, civil and military will absorb a billion and more. With all due allowance for underestimation of such requirements and for overestimation of total revenues, we may safely claim a possible billion of revenues for the service of the debt. On a six per cent basis, a billion of revenue would provide for a debt principal of sixteen and two-thirds billions. Germany can by this reckoning carry on the war until the autumn of 1920 without becoming actually insolvent.

In this calculation no account has been taken of the fact that Austro-Hungarian financial solvency is not less essential than German to the central powers, and that the Dual Monarchy is far from being in so solid a position as that of Germany. On the other hand, the German bond-buyer firmly believes that upon the close of the war the boundaries of the Empire will be considerably extended, and that the number of tax-payers will be notably increased. This view may be mistaken, but so long as it persists it will continue to strengthen the psychological basis of the government credit.

It is not to be supposed that the German taxpayer will view with equanimity the steady mounting of the national debt toward its absolute limit of sixteen billion dollars. The desire for an honorable peace, already in evidence, will increase in intensity as the prospect of a perpetual burden of crushing taxation grows darker. But it is a fantastic view that the nation which has sacrificed its lives so lavishly to what it conceives to be the cause of national honor and vital interests will accept a humiliating peace short of actual exhaustion of men or financial resources. In so far as the latter element is concerned, complete exhaustion can hardly supervene before 1919 or 1920, at the earliest. And we cannot confidently predict that even financial exhaustion will force the German to lay down his arms. Our own Confederacy fought best when its finances were most utterly demoralized.

Hiring and Firing

OLD-TIME political economy contemplated a certain supply of labor employed by a certain amount of capital, and receiving larger or smaller wages in proportion as the demand for labor rose or fell. Wages would tend towards a level not only in the same country but all over the world, for when wages were low in one place and high in another, the laborer would take up his belongings and migrate. Labor was considered to be mobile, and it was assumed that the wage-earner could easily change not only his city or country but his occupation. This mobility and elasticity of labor was considered the greatest possible social asset, since it permitted competition to work itself out beneficently.

We have long since learned that labor has neither the elasticity nor the mobility ascribed to it. A wage-earner is a bundle of faiths, habits, predilections and passions as well as a vehicle of labor power, and he will not always change his country for an extra dollar in the week. Nor can he easily change his occupation. He cannot, if he is a carpenter, suddenly become a locomotive engineer or blacksmith. Stability, continuity and team-work are becoming increasingly necessary in our industrial life, and all these make the wage-earner less replaceable than before. There are initial costs in breaking in new men. It no longer pays even from the point of view of the employers' profits alone, to hire men and discharge men at random, as has been the general custom.

This point is well illustrated in an address recently delivered by Mr. M. W. Alexander before the National Association of Manufacturers and reproduced in *American Industries*. Mr. Alexander starts from the premise that every unnecessary dismissal of an employee is a loss to the employer, to the employee himself and to society, and he seeks to estimate this loss by an analysis of employment statistics for twelve large, medium-sized and small metal manufacturing concerns in the United States. The largest of these concerns carried on its payroll ten thousand, the smallest less than three hundred employees.

The amount of apparently needless "hiring and firing" which Mr. Alexander found in these factories was large. At the beginning of the year 1912, which was chosen because it was considered typical, there were 37,274 employees in the twelve establishments; at the end there were 43,971 employees, indicating a net increase in the working force during these twelve months of 6,697 employees. But during these twelve months no fewer than 42,571 people had been hired, while 35,874 had been discharged. In other words, to increase the permanent force by 6,697 employees, 42,571, or six and one-third times as many, had been engaged.

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Of course not all of this hiring is needless. A certain number of employees—perhaps seven to eight-tenths of one per cent—die during the year. Others must be employed to take the place of men who are on sick leave, or of men who give up their jobs because they do not like the work or cannot stand the climate or for some other good reason. Again, new employees are required for short periods because of special stress of temporary work. No employment department can be run on a hundred per cent efficiency basis. However, even though we assume only an eighty per cent basis of hiring efficiency, we should find, according to Mr. Alexander's calculations, that the twelve factories studied would have been entitled to hire only 20,540 employees during the year 1912, while in fact they hired 42,571, or an excess of 22,031 persons.

But it costs money to hire men and fire them. There is the clerical work in connection with the hiring process. There is the cost of instruction, the increased wear and tear upon machinery owing to the new men's inexperience, the lessened production during the first weeks or months and the considerable loss due to spoiled work. This loss in unnecessarily hiring men is, of course, different for different groups of employees. It is greatest among piece-workers, who without previous experience or skill at the particular work are supposed to acquire proficiency within a few weeks or months, and it is smallest among unskilled workers, who are less differentiated and more easily replaced. Although there is no agreement among students of this problem, the careful calculations of Mr. Alexander estimate the loss from the unnecessary hiring of these 22,031 employees at $831,030, while, if certain overhead and other expenses had been considered, the loss would have been considerably greater and might have reached a million. If a similar percentage of loss should hold good for all the factories in the United States (which we do not assert), the annual loss to employers from the unnecessary hiring and discharging of employees could be measured in hundreds of millions of dollars.

If employers continue to lose these vast sums in unnecessary expenditure, would it not seem that they have not yet learned their business? Mr. Alexander intimates that employers do not make a careful study of this vital problem, do not put proper men in charge of the hiring of employees, do not advise new employees or give them specialized training courses, and do not seek to regulate the commercial end of the business so as to secure the greatest possible steadiness of employment throughout the year. Hiring and firing, the chief prerogatives of the "bread-giver," are usually exercised at haphazard, by rule of thumb, without study. In all big shops—as already in some—there should be a superintendent of employment, who would study this question as the engineer studies his problems, and who alone would exercise whatever right of discharge was vested in the employer. It does not pay to permit carefully trained workmen to leave a factory because of a quarrel with a foreman or because of any one of a thousand minor matters.

From the point of view of the employee and of society it is equally absurd. The loss borne by the 22,031 employees who filtered through these twelve establishments during the year 1912, would, if it could be exactly calculated, be even more significant than that to the employers. What do these men lose in wages not earned? What was their loss in self-respect, in industrial morale, in that disorganization and panic which comes from insecurity? The employee has as much interest as has the employer in a greater stability of labor without a sacrifice of its mobility, in a civil service in industry secured without the loss of the freedom to strike and the right to throw up one's job at will.

This power of determining when and how men shall be employed and discharged is in the end one with which employees as well as employers must deal. If far-sighted employers are able to take from their foremen the right to discharge, and vest that right in a less obviously biassed person—a superintendent of employment—why cannot systems be worked out in which employers' association and trade union will together approach this problem scientifically? The relation between employer and employee, whether the employer be an individual, a corporation or the whole nation, is too vital to permit the hiring and discharge of men to depend upon pique, temporary disagreements, short-time views, or the interest of one party. Permanently the employer cannot solve this problem alone.

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EDITORS
HERBERT CROLY WALTER LIPPMANN
PHILIP LITTELL FRANCIS HACKETT
WALTER E. WEYL CHARLOTTE RUDYARD
ALVIN S. JOHNSON

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American Use for German Ideals

IN all the intensity of feeling aroused by the war, we have somehow let escape us the consideration that the German ideals are the only broad and seizing ones that have lived in the world in our generation. Mad and barbarous as they may seem to minds accustomed to much thinner and nicer fare, one must have withdrawn far within a provincial Anglo-Saxon shell not to feel the thrill of their sheer heroic power. We have heard so much of the German industrialism and militarism that we have overlooked the reservoir bursting with spiritual energy that twentieth-century Germany has become. The bubbling intellectual and economic energy of present-day Italy is German; Nietzsche has raged through Italian thought, and when it was not Nietzsche it was Hegel. British political thought for forty years has come straight from German sources. What is the new social politics of liberalism but a German collectivism, half-heartedly grafted on a raw stock of individualist "liberty"? Our own progressivism has been a filter through the British strain, diluted with evangelical Christianity. Our educational framework has been German, though unintelligently so. Architecture and art-forms in England and Scandinavia are strikingly German. Town-planning methods and ideals have been lifted bodily. The French seem to have been driven by repulsion into sadly spiteful degenerations of taste in architecture and art-forms. Scarcely a country has been untouched by the German influence. No other country, except Russia, has been so flooding its influence over the twentieth-century world.

Surely the final test of a vital and fecund civilization, a civilization that has arrived, is the creation of novel and indigenous art-forms, that express with creative fidelity the spirit of the time. And mainly in Germany has there flowered in these first years of the century an original art—that shown in public buildings and domestic architecture of clean, massive and soaring lines, sculpture of militaristic solidity like the Leipzig and Bismarck monuments, endless variety of decorative and graphic art, printing and household design, civic art as embodied in the laying-out of cities and squares and parks. All this development has been of social art. Music and painting, the private cultivations, have been relatively feeble. Into social, public, reproducible forms has gone this burst of the daring German genius. And everywhere, as in the great ages of creative art, the styles are those in which form grows out of function, so that the work of factories and water-towers and railroad bridges suggests the motives of design. Steel and cement set the lines for wholly novel forms. The world sneers at this art. The world would. But the surge of German art-spirit, with its creation of novel forms, means one thing—that German ideals have a sure spiritual fecundity.

Our American mind has missed the significance of these social forms. We are not used to thinking in terms of the impersonal. The cosmic heroisms of the German ideal fall, too, strangely on our ears. We are not accustomed to gloat over history. It comes to us as a shock to find a people who believe in national spirits which are heroic, and through the German spirit, in a world-spirit; for "the world-spirit," says one of their professor-worriors, "speaks to-day through Germany." We have no analogy for the fact that "the ideal of organization, the thought of a tremendously valuable whole, uniting its free members for effective work, labors in the subconsciousness of millions of Germans, labors even where it does not come to the light of philosophic discussion."

Yet it is scarcely strange that the Germans should expect that a pioneer people like ourselves, of vast and restless energy, should sympathize with a pulsating ideal of organized energy which sinned through excess rather than defect, a true pioneer of twentieth-century civilization, which strove, as a great German has put it, "not for world-dominion, but for a rational organization of the world on the basis of voluntary coöperation, through the welding of a federal union of nations akin in interests and civilization."

The outstanding fact is that native American opinion did not take the side of the German ideal. When we were challenged we went with hearty unanimity against this ideal, the most fertile and potent before our eyes. Whether because we relapsed atavistically to our British roots, or because the incalculable energies of the German ideal really daunted us, we preferred to range our sympathy with the nations that were living on their funded nineteenth-century spiritual capital, rather than breaking new paths and creating new forms for a new time. Believing the German to be in error, we did not even feel a weakness for the tragic and heroic error as against the safe and fuddling plausibility.

I do not say that we did wrong in repudiating the German ideals, I only want to know what our repudiation means. It seemed intuitive rather than deliberate. It seemed to mean that we sensed in the German ideals tastes and endeavors pro-

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foundly alien to our own. And although it becomes more and more evident that, whatever the outcome of the war, all the opposing countries will be forced to adopt German organization, German collectivism, and have indeed shattered already most of the threads of their old easy individualism, we have taken the occasion rather to repudiate that modest collectivism which was raising its head here in the shape of the progressive movement in national politics.

We must not let ourselves forget that such an attitude implies a rejection of the most overwhelming and fecund group of ideas and forms in the modern world, ideas which draw all nations after them in imitation, while the nations pour out their lifeblood to crush the generator. Such a renunciation imposes upon us huge responsibility. We cannot seriously think merely of spewing everything German out of our mouths. To refuse the patient German science, the collectivist art, the valor of the German ideals, would be simply to expatriate ourselves from the modern world. They will not halt for any paltry distaste of ours. By taking sides against Germany we have committed ourselves to the arduous task of setting up ideals more worthy than hers to win the allegiance of our generation and time.

In this severe enterprise we shall get little help from the Allies whose cause we find to be that of "civilization." Both England and France are fighting to conserve, rather than to create. Our ideal we can only find in our still pioneer, still struggling American spirit. It will not be found in any purported defence of present "democracy," "civilization," "humanity." The horrors of peace in industrial plutocracies will always make such terms very nebulous. It will have to be in terms of values which secure all the vital fruits of the German ideals, without the tragic costs. It must be just as daring, just as modern, just as realistic. It must set the same social ends, the realization of the individual through the beloved community. It must replace a negative ideal of freedom as the mere removal of barriers by a freedom of expansion which consists, to quote the German, "in making the outward social forms adequate to the measure of the fullness of the national spirit."

Our ideal must be just as creative, just as social as the German, but pragmatically truer and juster. For we find in the German ideal, rousing and heroic as it is, the fatal flaw that has shattered the world's sympathies. The German "does his best in creating a highly organized community for the purpose of furthering in society the historic development of eternal values." Here is the vitiating touch—not in the ideals, but in their direction and animus. For if your enterprise is to be the working out of ideas, your success clearly depends upon living in a world where such ideas can be worked out. If they are set for you and the impulsion is all from behind, you take the truly colossal risk of assuming the perfect congeniality of the universe with your historic ideas. Let there be the smallest perversity in your world, the smallest kink on your historic path, and your ideal becomes a gigantic engine that has broken loose and lies threshing about in endless havoc. To work out a rigid ideal, the resistance you meet must be of the kind that transfigures both you and the resister. Belgium was not transfigured. If resistance is tough, your march becomes like the ruthless hewing-through of might.

It has been the tragedy of the German spirit that it has had to dwell in a perverse universe, so that what from within looked always like the most beneficent working-out of a world-idea seemed from without like the very running-amuck of voracious power. German ideals have, in fact, been floated on the stream of a great will, which has been no more a part of their detailed embodiments than the current is a part of the river craft. The German ideals, embodied in the German forms, are those of a peace-state. They can be conceived of as existing perfectly and indefinitely without this war. The German has confused the current with the rich and precious freight it was bearing. He often suggests a wistful desire to be tolerant. His ideals are tolerant. But, with his will, he is tragically unable to secure mutual understanding. His idea, with its terrific historic momentum, goes on grinding itself out, heedless of the world-situations in which it finds itself.

Our American contribution will then be not to crush the craft but to change the direction of the current. For the will, to substitute a great desire! Our ideals will not be pushes, but goals. For the expression of eternal values we will have the realizing of social ends through intelligent experimentation. To envisage the good life that we desire for our community and society, and to work towards it with all the intelligence and skill and resources we have—this must be our ideal. Whatever the German has that is life-enhancing—and a nation that lives so habitually at a maximum of energy must have more than we—that we must have, but it must come as the fruit of our intense desire and our intelligence in adapting means to ends, not as an imposed historic value. Our future must be the most intense focussing of our aesthetic and scientific possibilities. In the pragmatism of Dewey and James and the social philosophy of Royce, we have the intellectual tools for such an enterprise, ethical, social, political. We already see this spirit, barred from politics, making its way in educational and

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civic movements and in the thought of a younger generation. To set up such an American ideal would be to meet in overflowing measure the responsibility we put ourselves under in rejecting the German. To work out a democratic socialized life by deliberately applying intelligence and taste to the command of human and natural resources would be to set before the world an ideal far more fecund than that with which the Germans have challenged us. It would be beneficent and healing. Its power would really be to unite the world.

RANDOLPH BOURNE.

On Acquiring New Ears

I REMEMBER a concert I once heard in Vienna, where there were three fist-fights going on at once, a composer standing in one of the boxes shouting insults at the audience, a uniformed policeman dashing from group to group to separate belligerents, tearful wives entreating violent husbands to master their anger, and a hubbub of voices that made the rafters shake. Finally the police were called to clear the hall by force. And I remember another concert, this time in Paris, where hoots, guffaws and hisses drowned the music, and the audience was presently divided into groups of men chattering in frenzy and knots of awed foreigners studying local manners and customs. In particular I remember the gentleman of the seat next to me, who stood throughout the intermission and defied the Philistines as Ajax the lightning. The *casus belli* in both cases was a new kind of music. It has been dubbed, by common consent, futurist music.

This music has come to America. It has not come with a crash, as cubist and post-impressionist art came, nor will any music ever provoke a fist-fight in this land of free opinion. It has for the most part winked a modest eye at us here and there from the tail end of a concert program. Mr. Reinhold Werrenrath sang some early Schönberg songs, the Flonzaley Quartet played a Schönberg string quartet, the Chicago Orchestra played the "Six Orchestral Pieces", the Russian Symphony Orchestra of New York put Scriabine's "Prometheus", with color accompaniment, on one of last season's programs; minor men like Bartok occasionally have a short piece in some recital; the Boston orchestra has played the unclassifiable Sibelius Fourth Symphony; Mr. Busoni plays some of his pieces at semi-private concerts. But the avowed and official futurist composer, Pratella, has not been heard to the extent of a single note, and supremely able men like Stravinsky and Ravel—in his later period—are heard here only at small inquisitive gatherings of amateurs. And last winter twenty-year-old Leo Ornstein gave his series of four recitals which offered a fairly comprehensive survey of recent piano music, including his own astonishing works. The series was almost neglected by the New York daily press. Yet it was, on the whole, the most important event of the past musical season, just as the Flonzaley playing of the Schönberg quartet was the most important event of the one before. From the scraps which have thus been heard no single concert-goer is likely to gain a very clear idea of futurist music. American audiences, hospitable but not discriminative towards the new, are still wondering what they ought to think about it.

What then is futurist music? Actually it has no more right to a single name than the labor unrest or the present anti-materialistic trend in philosophy. It comes from many men, some of them strangers to each other in name and in influence. It has antecedents as various as the French salon and the Siberian steppe. Its several composers could not possibly agree on a theory or a manifesto. Yet it needs a name. It has a more than superficial homogeneity. It is born of one stage of musical evolution. It has certain uniformity in point of technical means. And, what is much more important, it has manifested itself to the man in the street as a music of a definite type—that which consists solely of discords. So we may as well continue for the present to lump the new music in one and call it "futurist".

Broadly speaking, futurist music is that which comes, in an evolutionary sense, after Strauss and Debussy. It is not national like the "impressionist" music of Debussy and Fauré. Three nations are represented by three names of almost equal eminence: Schönberg for Germany, Ravel for France, and Stravinsky for Russia. Whatever of freak or passing experimentation these men may practise, they are creative geniuses of very nearly the front rank. Sibelius now represents a parallel development in Finland, Sjögren possibly in Sweden, Cyril Scott and Granville Bantock in England, Kodaly and Bartok in Hungary, and Albeniz and Grovlez in Spain. Mr. Busoni, though utterly German in culture, writes futurist music with an Italian feeling that seems to place him across the Alps where Zandonai is the coming man. Men like Zemlinsky and Schrecker in Austria are hardly as much as names this side of the Atlantic.

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Such a hasty catalogue as the above may serve to map the field, but it must be held subject to correction. And any outline of the characteristics of the new music must be equally unsatisfactory except for the purpose of a bird's-eye-view. Yet the man in the street is right when he finds futurist music distinguished chiefly by dissonance. For though the "impressionists" of the 'nineties used dissonance freely, they sought to suppress its harshness, getting the maximum of color out of the harsh tones with the minimum of physical clash. Like the impressionists in painting they used ugliness freely, but only in a beautiful way: the grime and stench of the city entered into Whistler's nocturnes only to be sucked up into the pervading tone of ghostly beauty. The newer painters seek the "maximum of color efficiency" and the like, producing effects which to unaccustomed eyes are bald and painful. In exactly the same way the "post-impressionist" composers use dissonance in its freest and harshest forms. This is true of all futurist composers of all nationalities, and it is the most obvious fact about them. But this is not because they are working with a common program. It is because the old musical materials are for all practical purposes exhausted—a hypothesis sufficiently established by the plain fact that a great many highly endowed men have found it necessary at the same time to go on to a new set of materials.

I might suggest other general qualities of the new composers—their reaction against "program," their love of the abstract, their abhorrence of rule and repetition, their curious theoretic preoccupation with the "essence," the *noumenon,* the *Ding an sich,* and similar paraphernalia borrowed from idealistic philosophy. But all that is quite useless until we have got past this matter of dissonance. Dissonance in the new music brings us to a dead stop. It smites us lustily in the face, and in the delirium of pain we have no heart or stomach for further aesthetic appreciation. The man in the street is right. Dissonance is the first fact about futurist music.

The matter stands briefly thus: Dissonance, unresolved and unassuaged, sounds ugly; if this music is ugly we cannot like it—no, not though all musical evolution hangs momentously on our decision. This is no theoretical question. It is not a matter of the definition of beauty. On the definition of beauty the god Apollo stubbed his toe, and who are we to justify a new art with a new definition? The matter, whether we like it or not, is a technical one. For it is a matter which takes its rise from the mechanics of the thing rather than from its feeling. In a literal and physiological sense it is our ears which tell us that futurist music is ugly. Now if a work of undeniable genius is undeniably ugly there arises a painful difficulty. And the difficulty must be solved not by the aesthetician but by the surgeon.

To appreciate this new music we must acquire a new set of ears. We must neglect the norms and standards with which we listened to Bach and adopt new ones from the new music itself. Whether or not we "should" do this may be decided by the critics at their leisure. But the fact is that if we are to make head or tail of the new music, we have got to. For this music is, at its extreme, almost unrelated to the music which went before. This was not true of Wagner's music, which was developed from Beethoven, nor of Strauss's, which was developed from Wagner. It was not even true of Debussy's, though that contained a radically new element of technical procedure. But futurist music has rejected definitely and all but completely the impressive system of concords established by unknown monks in the fourteenth century, sanctified by Palestrina in the sixteenth, standardized by Bach in the eighteenth, and codified by Helmholz in the nineteenth. In futurist music the third—major and minor—has ceased to be the harmonic norm, the foundation of a vast conventionalized system. The demonstration of this is a matter of detailed technical analysis. And the moral, to many, is that the new music is bad. But the fact cannot be questioned. In futurist music the notes are not related on the basis of the third. It is doubtful if, in Schönberg's piano pieces, for instance, they are related in any genuinely harmonic way whatever. The idea that there should be a definite break in musical evolution, and that that break should come just now, may be startling to many, though the case is not so desperate as it sounds, since it is not musical evolution which is breaking, but somebody's theories about it. But art is continually taking fresh leaps in new directions. So Shakespeare broke with Aristotle, Tolstoy with Pushkin, and Walt Whitman with Keats.

Doubtless there is an evolutionary connection between the old music and the new, even here. Possibly Debussy's break with tradition was more radical than Schönberg's, though the latter's was complete and the former's wasn't. But the point is that our ears have not lived through the intermediate stages. The new music reaches them as something utterly strange and disconcerting, hence ugly. The ears we have trained in so many of the old concert-halls at such a cost of dollars are useless for the new. We may reject the new as not worth the trouble; and so long as we are happy in the old and undisturbed by corrosive curiosity perhaps it is just as well. But if we are to enjoy futurist music, if we are to get the paraphernalia for perceiving, relating and synthesizing the modern elements into an art, we must learn to hear anew.

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This may seem absurd, for few laymen appreciate to what an extent musical aesthetics is a matter of psychology. We ordinarily assume that music "expresses" by some divine charm, that the composer who sings of love has "discovered" the proper musical statement of love's emotion. But musical materials are not discovered; they are manufactured. It is by habit and repetition, not by intuition, that we come to accept chords or dissonance. The major and minor third of the old music is very sweet because it is very familiar. The new bald colors of futurist music are ugly because they are strange. Our ears contain little formulæ, so to speak, for the chords and scales that have been ground into our consciousness by frequent hearings. When we hear a new piece of music it must agree with them to some degree, else we feel uncomfortable. Now these formulæ, though they thrive on variation, hate negation. So if the new music negates them entirely, as futurist music does, there is no entente possible. Our ears will not serve our purpose. We must become familiar with the new style.

I am not asserting that musical compositions are equally beautiful if equally familiar. I am in fact speaking not of musical compositions but of musical styles. And it is not so much the futurist compositions as the style of them—the dissonant musical material—that people object to. But a work of art must not be considered bad because its language is unfamiliar. A poem by Goethe may be as excellent as a poem by Shakespeare even though an Englishman cannot understand it. The dissonant material of futurist music is in every way as legitimate as the old harmonic material, provided it is used by genius and not by mediocrity. Whether futurist compositions are excellent depends on things difficult or useless to analyze. But whether the materials of futurist music are capable of conveying new meaning and beauty to us depends chiefly on our ability to acquire new ears.

Yet this need not be a long process. The learner can acquire in a day what it took the teacher a year to discover. We can store up in our ears a supply of psychological norms for Schönberg, over and above those which we gratefully keep for Schubert. Though most of the futurist composers violently repudiate any system, be sure we shall discover uniformities in their work, type words and phrases, even a growing syntax and logic of form. Out of these we shall make our new ears. We shall discover units of "color" in the chords which now seem undifferentiated in their ugliness. We shall perhaps learn to listen, as ears have not listened for a century, to the rich and diverse movement of inner voices. With the new harmony there seems to be coming a new and freer polyphony. And gradually, as we become accusomed to the new materials, somebody—probably the composer—will whisper in our ear that this or that type of dissonance or polyphony "expresses" love or envy or longing. Such suggestion will probably suffice to give the music meaning. The suggestion will become forever associated with the music, just as in speech the image is associated with the word. And presently this new, ugly, abstract music will have become familiar, beautiful and poetic! So it goes in this disconcerting business of acquiring new ears. At the first hearing the thing is ugly; at the second, interesting; and at the third—if the gods so will—beautiful.

H. K. Moderwell.

One of Our Conquerors

WHEN Dr. Alexander Mackintosh Butcher was elected to the presidency of Pluribus University ten years ago, there was general agreement that in selecting a man who was not only a distinguished educator but an executive of marked business ability the trustees had done honor to themselves and their university as well as to the new president. For Dr. Butcher had that peculiar genius which would have made him as successful in Wall Street or in a governor's chair as in the classroom. Every alumnus of Pluribus knows the story told of the young Alexander Mackintosh Butcher, standing at the age of twenty-two at the threshold of a career. Eager, energetic, with a brilliant scholastic record behind him, it was difficult to decide into what profession he should throw his powerful talents. To his beloved and aged president the young man went for counsel. "My boy," said the good old man, "remember that no profession offers nobler opportunities for service to humanity than that of education." And what should he teach? "Philosophy is the noblest study of man." And a professor of philosophy the young Butcher speedily became.

Those who were so fortunate as to study philosophy under him at Pluribus will never forget how uncompromisingly he preached absolute idealism, the Good, the True and the Beautiful, or how witheringly he excoriated the mushroom philosophies which were springing up to challenge the eternal verities. I have heard his old students remark the secret anguish which must have been his when later, as president of the university, he was compelled to entertain the famous Swiss philosopher, Monsfilius, whose alluring empiricism was taking the philosophic world by sto m.

Dr. Butcher's philosophic acuteness is only equaled by his political rectitude. Indeed, it is

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as philosopher-politician that he holds the unique place he does in our American life, injecting into the petty issues of the political arena the immutable principles of Truth. Early conscious of his duty as a man and a citizen, he joined the historic party which had earned the eternal allegiance of the nation by rescuing it from slavery. By faithful service to the chiefs of his state organization, first under the powerful Flatt, and later under the well-known Harnes, himself college-bred and a political philosopher of no mean merit, the young Dr. Butcher worked his way up through ward captain to the position of district leader. The practical example of Dr. Butcher, the scholar and educator, leaving the peace of his academic shades to carry the banner in the service of his party ideals of Prosperity and Protection has been an inspiration to thousands of educated men in these days of civic cowardice. When, three years ago, his long and faithful services were rewarded by the honor of second place on the Presidential ticket which swept the great states of Mormonia and Green Mountain, there were none of his friends and admirers who felt that the distinction was undeserved.

President Butcher is frequently called into the councils of the party whenever there are resolutions to be drawn up or statements of philosophic principle to be issued. He is in great demand also as chairman of state conventions, which his rare academic distinction lifts far above the usual level of such affairs. It was at one of these conventions that he made the memorable speech in which he drew the analogy between the immutability of Anglo-Saxon political institutions and the multiplication table. To the applause of the keen and hard-headed business men and lawyers who sat as delegates under him, he scored with matchless satire the idea of progress in politics, and demonstrated to their complete satisfaction that it was as absurd to tinker with the fundamentals of our political system as it would be to construct a new arithmetic. In such characteristic wisdom we have the intellectual calibre of the man.

This brilliant and profound address came only as the fruit of a lifetime of thought on political philosophy. President Butcher's treatise on "Why We Should Never Change Any Form of Government" has been worth more to thoughtful men than thousands of sermons on civic righteousness. No one who has ever heard President Butcher's rotund voice discuss in a public address "those ideas and practices which have been tried and tested by a thousand years of experience" will ever allow his mind to dwell again on the progressive and disintegrating tendencies of the day, nor will he have the heart again to challenge on any subject the " decent respect for the common opinions of mankind."

President Butcher's social philosophy is as sound as his political. The flexibility of his mind is shown in the fact that, although an immutabilist in politics, he is a staunch Darwinian in sociology. Himself triumphantly fit, he never wearies of expressing his robust contempt for the unfit who encumber the earth. His essay on "The Insurrection of the Maladjusted" is already a classic in American literature. The trenchant attack on modern social movements as the impudent revolt of the unfit against those who, by their personal merits and industry, have, like himself, achieved success, has been a grateful bulwark to thousands who might otherwise have been swept sentimentally from their moorings by those false guides who erect their own weakness and failure into a criticism of society.

Dr. Butcher's literary eminence has not only won him a chair in the "American Academy of All the Arts, Sciences, and Philosophies," but has made him almost as well known abroad as at home. He has lectured before the learned societies of Lisbon on "The American at Home," and he has a wide circle of acquaintances in every capital in Europe. Most of the foreign universities have awarded him honorary degrees. In spite of his stout Americanism, Dr. Butcher has one of the most cosmopolitan of minds. His essay on " The Cosmopolitan Intellect " has been translated into every civilized language. With his admired friend, Owen Griffith, he has collaborated in the latter's endeavor to beat the swords of industrial exploitation into the ploughshares of universal peace. He has served in numerous capacities on Griffith's many peace boards and foundations, and has advised him widely and well how to distribute his millions so as to prevent the recurrence of war in future centuries.

Let it not be thought that, in recounting President Butcher's public life and services, I am minimizing his distinction as a university administrator. As executive of one of the largest universities in America, he has raised the position of college president to a dignity surpassed by scarcely any office except President of the United States. The splendid $125,000 mansion which President Butcher had the trustees of Pluribus build for him on the heights overlooking the city, where he entertains distinguished foreign guests with all the pomp worthy of his high office, is the precise measure both of the majesty with which he has endowed the hitherto relatively humble position, and the appreciation of a grateful university. The relations between President Butcher and the trustees of Pluribus have always been of the most beautiful nature. The warm and profound intellectual sympathy which he feels for the methods and practices of

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the financial and corporate world, and the extensive personal affiliations he has formed with its leaders, have made it possible to leave in his hands a large measure of absolute authority. Huge endowments have made Pluribus under President Butcher's rule one of the wealthiest of our higher institutions of learning. With a rare intuitive response to the spirit of the time, the President has labored to make it the biggest and most comprehensive of its kind. Already its schools are numbered by the dozens, its buildings by the scores, its instructors by the hundreds, its students by the thousands, its income by the millions, and its possessions by the tens of millions.

None who have seen President Butcher in the commencement exercises of Pluribus can ever forget the impressiveness of the spectacle. His resemblance to Henry VIII is more marked now that he has donned the crimson gown and flat hat of the famous English university which gave him the degree of LL.D. Seated in a high-backed chair—the historic chair of the first colonial president of Pluribus—surrounded by tier upon tier of his retinue of the thousand professors of the university, President Alexander Mackintosh Butcher presents the degrees, and in his emphatic voice warns the five thousand graduates before him against everything new, everything untried, everything untested.

Only one office could tempt President Butcher from his high estate. Yet even those enthusiastic alumni and those devoted professors who long to see him President of the United States have little hope of tempting him from his duties to his alma mater. Having set his hand to the plough, he must see Pluribus through her harvest season, and may God prosper the work! So, beloved of all, alumni and instructors alike, the idol of the undergraduates, a national oracle of Prosperity and Peace, President Butcher passes to a green old age, a truly Olympian figure of the time.

JUVENIS.

Liberalism and Culture

MODERN reformers, religious and political, have usually retained the classic theory of orthodoxy, namely, that there is one right or true system—democracy and free thought, for instance—which it is the reformer's duty to establish in the place of prevalent abuses. Certainly Luther and Calvin and the doctrinaires of the French revolution only meant to substitute one orthodoxy for another, and what they set forth they regarded as valid for all men and forever. Nevertheless they had a greater success in discrediting the received system than in establishing their own, and the general effect of their reforms was to introduce the modern conception of liberty, the liberty of liberalism.

This consists in limiting the prescriptions of the law to a few points, for the most part negative, leaving it to the initiative and conscience of individuals to order their life and conversation as they like, provided only they do not interfere with the same freedom in others. In practice liberal countries have never reached this ideal of peaceful anarchy, but have continued to enforce state education, monogamy, the vested rights of property, and sometimes military service. But within whatever limits, liberty is understood to lie in the individual being left alone, so that he may express his personal impulses as he pleases in word and action.

A philosopher can readily see that this liberal ideal implies a certain view about the relations of man in the universe. It implies that the ultimate environment, divine or natural, is either chaotic in itself or undiscoverable by human science, and that human nature, too, is either radically various or only determinable in a few essentials, round which individual variations play *ad libitum*. For this reason no normal religion, science, art, or way of happiness can be prescribed. These remain always open, even in their foundations, for each man to arrange for himself. The more things are essentially unsettled and optional, the more liberty of this sort there may safely be in the world and the deeper it may run.

Man, however, is a gregarious animal, and much more so in his mind than in his body. He may like to go alone for a walk, but hates to stand alone in his opinions. And he is so imitative that what he thinks he most wishes to do is whatever he sees other people doing. Hence if compulsory organization disappears a thousand free and private organizations at once take its place. Virginal liberty is good only to be surrendered at the right time to a right influence. A state in which government is limited to police duty must allow churches, universities (with millionaires to found them), public sports, private charities, masonic or monastic orders, and every other sort of party institution, to flourish within it unhindered; otherwise that state would hardly be civilized and nothing of importance would ever be done in it. Yet the prevalence

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of such free associations will jeopardize the perfect liberty which individuals are supposed to enjoy. Private organizations are meddlesome; if they cannot impose themselves by force, they insinuate themselves by propaganda, and no paternal government ever exerted so pervasive and indiscreet an influence as they know how to acquire. Fashions in speech or clothes are harder to evade than any laws, and religion, when it is chosen and sectarian, eats more into the soul than when it is established and conventional. In a society honeycombed by private societies a man finds his life supervised, his opportunities pre-empted, his conscience intimidated, and his pocket drained. Every one he meets informs him of a new duty and presents him with a new subscription list. At every turn he must choose between being incorporated or being ostracised. Indeed, the worst and most radical failure in his fabled liberty of choice is that he never had a choice about his environment or about his faculties, and has to take his luck as to his body, his mind, his position, his country, and his family. Even where he may cast a vote, his vote is far from decisive. In electing a government, as in selecting a wife, only two or three candidates are commonly available, and the freeman's modest privilege is to declare hopefully which one he wants and then to put up with the one he gets.

If liberalism had been a primitive system, with no positive institutions behind it, it would have left human genius in the most depressed and forlorn condition. The organized part of life would have been a choice among little servitudes, and the free personal part would have been a blank. Fortunately, liberal ages have been secondary ages, inheriting the monuments, the feelings, and the social diversity of previous times, when men had lived in compulsive unison, having only one unquestioned religion, one style of art, one political order, one common spring of laughter and tears. Liberalism has come to remove the strain and the trammels of these traditions without as yet uprooting the traditions themselves. Most people retain their preliberal heritage and hardly remember that they are legally free to abandon it and to sample any and every other form of life. Liberalism does not go very deep; it is an adventitious principle, a mere loosening of an older structure. For that reason it brings to all who felt cramped and ill-suited such comfort and belief. It offers the man escape from all sorts of accidental tyrannies. It opens to them that sweet, scholarly, tenderly moral, critically superior attitude of mind which Matthew Arnold called culture.

Primitive, dragooned, unanimous ages cannot possess culture. What they possess is what the Germans call a *Kultur,* some type or other of manners, laws, implements, arts, religion. When these national possessions are perused and relished by some individual who does not take them for granted and who understands and judges them as if from outside, his acquaintance with them becomes an element in his culture; and if he is at home in many such forms of life and thought, his culture is the more perfect. It should ideally be culled from everywhere. Culture is a triumph of the individual over society. It is his way of profiting intellectually by a world he has not helped to make.

Culture requires liberalism for its foundation, and liberalism requires culture for its crown. It is culture that integrates in imagination the activities which liberalism so dangerously disperses in practice. Out of the public disarray of beliefs and efforts it gathers its private collection of curiosities, much as amateurs stock their museums with fragments of ancient works. It possesses a wealth of vicarious experience and historical insight which comforts it for having nothing of its own to contribute to history. The man of culture abounds in discriminating sentiments; he lives under the distant influence of exalted minds; his familiar thoughts at breakfast are intimate appreciation of poetry and art, and if his culture is really mellow, he sometimes smiles a little at his own culture.

Culture came into the modern world with the renaissance, when personal humors and remote inspiration broke in upon the consecrated mediæval mind. Piety and learning had their intrinsic charms, but, after all, they had been cultivated for the sake of ulterior duties and benefits, and in order to appropriate and hand down the revealed wisdom which opened the way to heaven. Culture, on the contrary, had no ulterior purpose, no forced unity. It was an aroma inhaled by those who walked in the evening in the garden of life. Far from being a means to religion, it threw religion also into the context of human experience, and touched its mysteries and quarrels with judgment and elegance. It liberated the studious mind from obligatory or national discipline, and as far as possible from all bonds of time, place, utility, and cooperation, kindling sympathies by preference with what was most exotic, and compensating the mind for the ignominious necessity of having to be, in practical matters, local and partisan. Culture was courteous, open, unconscious of self; it was the joy of living every life but one's own. And its moral side—for everything has its moral side—lay in the self-knowledge it fostered, the clear sense it awakened of the different qualities and values of things. The scale of values established by the man of culture might sometimes be fanciful or frivolous, but he was always most scrupulous, according to

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his lights, in distinguishing the better from the worse. This conscientiousness, after all, is the only form of morality that a liberal society can insist upon.

The days of liberalism are numbered. First the horrors of competition discredited it, and now the trial of war, which it foolishly thought it could elude. The vogue of culture, too, has declined. We see that the man whose success is merely personal—the actor, the sophist, the millionaire, the æsthete—is incurably vulgar. The rightness of liberalism is exactly proportional to the diversity of human nature, to its vague hold on its ideals. Where this vagueness and play of variation stop, and they stop not far below the surface, the sphere of public organization should begin. It is in the subsoil of uniformity, or tradition, of dire necessity that human welfare is rooted, together with wisdom and unaffected art, and the flowers of culture that do not draw their sap from that soil are only paper flowers.

GEORGE SANTAYANA.

For A Citizen Army

OF all the phases of the question of preparedness which the Congress will chiefly consider this winter, the problem of moulding the United States army to fit the genius of the people of the United States and their aspiring democratic aims is probably the most vital. What the Administration intends to recommend to Congress in this respect will not be definitely known for some weeks; and perhaps not till President Wilson delivers his message will the public be permitted to learn even the general principles of the new organization whose birth can be only a matter of months. Until the end of the summer it was doubtful whether the Administration had determined to yield to the cry for preparedness. The Democrats, however, have very evidently come to the conclusion that if they fail to undertake the task of revising upward our military system, the Republicans will sweep them aside and do the job instead. Mere political sense may, of course, be motivating the Washington government, but there are signs that office-holding is not the only spur to action, and symptoms exist that the action may contain elements of real statesmanship.

If he makes his own what appears to be prevailing expert War Department opinion, the President will set before Congress a bill or several bills providing for the first steps necessary to create in this country a "citizen army" after the model of Switzerland or Australia. Mr. Wilson has already told the country that it needs a citizen army, and Mr. Bryan went him one worse and told the country that it already is a citizen army, able to spring forth armed and equipped between the sunrise and the sunset of the same day. Unsatisfied with this assurance, however, the army War College has gathered into a valuable pamphlet, published by the Senate last winter as Document No. 796, very complete expositions of the subject, together with accounts of how the two best systems operate in their native lands. Major General Leonard Wood has repeatedly advocated a volunteer federal militia; so have other military authorities and publicists without number. It remains to be seen whether there is strength enough and intelligence enough in those who shape and enact legislation to make the reorganization that is thus suggested, or whether the usual pull of inertia and ignorance will result in giving us merely more of a standing army and possibly more federal aid to the National Guard.

Concerning the underlying theory of the Swiss militia or citizen army there seems to be a strange lack of knowledge. The term "militia" misleads many into believing that there is no difference between this system and that already in use in the United States. Even certain members of Congress who have been talking loudly about preparedness do not distinguish the essentials of the Swiss system. Basically, it is a democratic scheme, requiring of every male citizen training and practice in arms. According to War College testimony, every Swiss citizen is a soldier, unless barred from service by physical and mental disabilities. Professional soldiers are few and are assigned mainly to the work of military education. The *elite* or active army is composed of all men who pass the examinations and are received as recruits. After twelve years' service in the *elite,* the men pass to the *landwehr,* and at the age of forty-five to the *landsturm* or reserve. Instruction begins at eleven with the cadet corps, which are voluntary organizations of boys, trained in marching drills and some exercises in the manual of arms. Between the ages of sixteen and twenty the Swiss lad may join a preparatory military organization, and is furnished with a regular army rifle. Chief attention is given, not to parades and drills, but to gymnastics and shooting. Regular military service begins for each man at the age of twenty. Each citizen soldier is fitted out with a uniform and complete field equip-

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ment. With these he is kept supplied till the end of his military service at fifty.

"The contrast between this sort of military training and that seen in England or America," declares one of the reports of the War College, "is most marked. The psychological effect on the men is certainly important. The first conceptions of the real business of a soldier, his whole reason for existence, are apt to produce a lasting impression on a young man. In Switzerland there are no parades or reviews or drills beyond the company or battalion. These things would doubtless be done in some measure if there existed a permanent army, but they would always come last and be least thought of, because through the push of stern necessity the Swiss has sifted out the absolute essentials to fitness for war, and these essentials, field exercises and good shooting, he works to the exclusion of everything else."

"We have accustomed ourselves," says Colonel Sanger, commenting upon this system, "to believe that . . . leaving everything to the last moment . . . is a distinctive trait of democracies, and that complete preparation for war during peace would only be made when a state was dominated by the will of a powerful emperor. But in Switzerland we find a country strongly permeated with the most advanced principles of democracy, carefully arranging every detail of the work which follows an order to mobilize their forces, and recognizing the duty, which democracies should not try to evade, of protecting their soldiers from unnecessary suffering by giving to the cantonal and federal forces the best possible organization and proper training."

Signs are not lacking that to the idea of a democratically raised volunteer army there will be stalwart opposition. Much of this opposition will be on the entirely simple and comprehensible grounds that both expediency and principle demand immediately a larger standing army, and that the people are not to be trusted with a too intimate knowledge of things military, let alone guns to be stood in the chimney corner, or next the sitting-room radiator. Times have changed, runs the argument, since the early days of the republic when every able-bodied man was a minute man, prompt to rally on the common when the public welfare was endangered. This is indeed true, but the years have not materially altered human nature, nor made it any less desirable to distribute firearms among a people rather than concentrate them with experts at the command of an unrepresentative government. There is food for serious reflection in the idea that, in an age when nations settle their destinies by force, the distribution of arms among individuals is not as important a problem as the distribution of wealth. No one would be surprised to find the Mr. Barnes's of the land frankly urging as a deliberate policy the removal of all wealth from the people and the placing of it in the hands of the astute and privileged few, but probably the majority would agree that social equilibrium would better be maintained when everybody has a bank account. As with cash and income, so, to a less degree, with guns and the knowledge of their use. Facing the alternative of swelling to a menace the permanent, professional armed force of the nation, or of spreading military education and duty throughout the state, there can be little doubt how the democrat must cast his vote.

Figures have been repeatedly published of late to demonstrate that, measured in terms of money alone, the country is paying too much for the institution called the United States Army, including its sixteen reserves. The blame may be variously placed for purposes of political advantage, but it really rests on the lack of intelligent interest which the people as a people have taken in things military. Here as in a hundred other mentionable and unmentioned ways they have let themselves be fooled. Common sense indicates that a defence maintained by excessive taxation is a drain upon society. To be sure, if defense is to be kept up, there will have to be very soon a large initial expenditure for the purpose of changing the system. But the technical literature of the subject is full of outlines of schemes for a citizen army, every one of which makes it plain that by investing fewer millions per year than would be necessary to increase the standing army adequately, an efficient, ever-ready, non-militaristic force can be raised and kept raised. One estimate places the annual appropriation at $16,000,000, and for this it is promised to produce within eight years a well-trained, well-officered reserve army of nearly half a million men, a number generally believed by secretaries of war to be reasonable.

Any program of preparedness presented to Congress this winter is bound to have difficult sledding. The passivists will unquestionably oppose every suggestion that means an increase in appropriations. The politicians will each howl for that scheme which gives to his own district the little gift requisite for local fame and security. The advocates of the policy of basing our military strength on an enlarged standing army will be busily at work. The National Guard will of course re-declare its faith in its existence to the exclusion of a federally aided and managed militia. Jingoism will cry for haste and be done with argument about method, while conservatism may prevent any enactment except the old, stupid waste and muddle. Through this rough welter some one, perhaps the Administration, perhaps other forces, will have to lead the straight way; the way of all ways that will produce for the

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United States a land army, in organization, spirit and control close to the people themselves, the laborers, the clerks, the farmers, the small business and professional men; an army maintained at the least cost to all and serving to the utmost the interests of organized society both in time of peace and in seasons of defensive warfare.

W. L. STODDARD.

The Submarines

WHEN I was in Berlin I saw von Jagow for half an hour alone, in the big Foreign room where I suppose the scrap of paper incident occurred. Von Jagow is not at all of the Prussian type; he appears to be a man of humor and taste. He had in his hand that afternoon the Dutch protest—a fat mass of typewritten manuscript—against the submarine blockade. I said to von Jagow that if American travellers were killed by German submarines—this was before the Lusitania—the American people would not put up with it. He replied, with diplomatic precision, that an American travelling in the war zone which the Germans had "declared" was in the same position as though he were walking between the trenches.

Later on I told Lord Bertie in Paris that there would be trouble, to which Lord Bertie replied that he believed the German position was a big bluff. A few weeks later the Lusitania's sinking proved him wrong.

I should like to point out what underlies the German attitude toward England and toward the United States. There is at present no shortage of anything in Germany, but if the war lasts long enough there will be. I do not know if it will be a shortage of food or money or munitions of war, but a shortage there will be. That is why I believe the Germans will try as soon as possible to get a decision in the West, and that is why I believe, if they lose, that they will surely lose the war.

They know that, and wish to shake Great Britain's command of the sea at any cost. They do not want us in the war any more than they wanted England in the war, but our trade with the Allies enlarges day by day, and they will smash it if they can. Were the bulk of our trade with England and France carried in American, not English merchant ships, we should be at war to-day, for to Germany the question of breaking Great Britain's commerce is a vital one.

Germany never intended to sink without warning the old junk which represents our ocean-going marine; it was not worth the risk. None of our ships except the Gulflight have been sunk that way, but Norwegian ships have been, because Norway is a weak nation with an important merchant fleet. Ideas of justice do not enter at all into German theories; they fight, from the point of view of policy, whom and how they please.

Therefore the only argument held valid in Germany is whether the submarine game is worth the candle. So far it has not been, but few dare prophesy what success the larger types of the future may attain. It was over this point that recently the ever-smouldering quarrel between Tirpitz and Bethmann-Hollweg blazed out; a naval writer of the Chancellor's faction said that America's influence with the lesser neutrals outweighed such results as the submarines had achieved, or were likely to achieve. Tirpitz denied this, and no one knows what is going on in the shipyards of Kiel.

But what is known, or can be guessed, is of vital importance to England and even to the United States. The present type of submarines can be destroyed in the following ways:

(a) by mine fields or nets near shore;
(b) by gunfire or ramming of destroyers;
(c) by unexpected fire from apparently unarmed ships.

As regards mine fields and nets little is known. Probably they only serve to protect certain waters. I know the rumors current in England of forty-six submarines caught in this way, but I simply do not believe them. For obvious reasons the admiralty gives out no information—since the Germans can never tell if, how, when, or where a submarine is lost—but this state of affairs breeds rumors. No doubt a few have been netted.

As regards the destroyers, they can finish off a submarine if they are sufficiently close. Their method is to rush at top speed straight for the submarine, firing as they go, and ramming the enemy before he can submerge, which takes time. But the newer types are quick submergers. Moreover, the submarines are ingenious. One of them, so the story goes, meanly attached a periscope to a floating mine, where a fleet of destroyers would see it, and one destroyer rammed it, thus finishing itself. Then the submarine came to the surface, and when the destroyers made a rush for it, it submerged, but left a periscope attached to another floating mine. Exit a second destroyer. Nevertheless the destroyers with their high speed are the worst enemies which the submarine must face.

As regards attacks upon submarines by merchant ships, their success is due to the treachery inherent in all warfare. In the past, it was perfectly safe for a cruiser or privateer to halt a merchantman before sinking it. Even though armed, the merchantman never hoped for more than a stern chase and battle; I never heard of a case where a merchantman sank a warship. The warships, being therefore safe, could almost always save the lives

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of the crews, and this custom gradually crystallized into a tenet of international law.

But submarines are different. "Our poor submarines," von Jagow called them. It is not ridiculous to call them "poor" submarines. They are brittle shells full of machinery. Suppose one comes up—as von Weddigen is believed by Germans to have done—to halt a Swedish ship. He fires his little gun; it halts. Suddenly, without warning, a concealed gun is fired from the supposed Swede; a shell hits the submarine; and down she goes, with all on board, like lead. In the old days, a single shot fired like that at a cruiser would have done her little harm, would certainly not have sunk her; and the chances are that those who fired the shot would be swinging soon at the yard arm.

Under present conditions, if merchant ships receive orders to resist submarines by force, or if auxiliary cruisers disguise themselves as merchantmen, then submarines will surely attack without warning, international law or no international law, for that is human nature. But I personally believe that within a few years a type of submarine will be constructed which will be as safe from attack by merchantmen as a cruiser is. We shall have in all likelihood submarine dreadnoughts of five thousand or ten thousand tons, which no single shot could possibly sink.

In conclusion, I do not believe there is more than the barest chance that Germany can seriously interfere with Great Britain's control of the sea, but Tirpitz at least believes that this chance is Germany's best chance to win the war; and Tirpitz is a great political power. Therefore Germany will not give up her submarine war, and she will continue to torpedo British merchantmen without warning—whether Americans are on board or not—unless England agrees that neither her merchant ships nor her auxiliaries disguised as merchant ships shall offer any resistance save the solitary one of flight.

GERALD MORGAN.

A COMMUNICATION

"A New Kind of War"

SIR: Having been cut off from newspapers for some weeks I have been unable to deal with Professor Usher's criticism in your issue of August 7th of some proposals made by myself in the preceding issue.

In order to render the discussion intelligible it is necessary to recall the proposal. It was this:

That as an alternative to joining the Allies in their military operations against Germany, America should settle her present blockade and contraband dispute with England by offering to coöperate with her to control overseas trade for the express purpose of preventing Germany securing supplies during the period of military operations, and so of creating something wherewith to bargain, and some means of coercion other than military power, even after the military operations were brought to an end. Out of the arrangements made between the enemies of Germany—among whom in this hypothesis America would in an economic sense be included—for dealing with the problem of supplies in wartime might grow international machinery for dealing "not merely with matters of exports and imports, with trade between them, but with financial arrangements as well—with exchange and credit difficulties, loans, censorship of mails and all the thorny problems that have arisen during the war. From these matters the international body might perhaps proceed to deal with such problems as the disposal of German property—interned ships, businesses of various kinds, royalties on patents, bank balances and so forth—and, it may be, more remote arrangements as to the future control of German action in the world: tariff arrangements; the conditions upon which Germany should at the peace be once more admitted to the community of nations, whether or equal terms or not; whether the most efficient means of exacting some indemnification for damage done might not be by sequestration of German property throughout the world and possibly some surtax by tariff, ship and mail dues, all of course subject to due legal judgment of an international court. In short, there would be in the bodies so created, the beginnings of the world organization of our common resources, social, economical and political, for the purpose of dealing with a recalcitrant member of international society by other than purely military means—a starting point whence international law might be made a reality, a code, that is, not merely expressing the general interest but sanctioning processes which furnish means of enforcing respect for it."

To this proposal Professor Usher objects:

> Under this specious guise of an international council controlling the overseas trade of the world with all countries except Germany, Mr. Angell proposes to strip England of her control of the seas. . . . In return for such cession of England's present authority he urges no *quid pro quo* whatever, and does not even discuss the necessity of granting one to secure the cessation itself. . . . But does not this scheme require England to cede to others that very control of the seas which she regards as the foundation of her national independence? Is it not this the control at which the German fleet is aimed and which every effort of England has been made to insure beyond peradventure? Must not its loss seem to Englishmen the very greatest possible blow (short of invasion) which a crushing defeat of the Allies by Germany might deal them? Moreover, is not this arbitrary exercise of authority by England, of which Mr. Angell writes, the very right which the English are supremely anxious to

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preserve? How, too, can it really be transferred to others while the English fleet outnumbers the fleets of its allies and all neutrals combined?

I cannot believe that such a council would do more than . . . reveal in all their nakedness the fundamental difficulties which now hold nations apart. These lie in the fact that England does have control of the seas and that all other nations have something to gain from taking it away from her, and *per contra* that England has everything to lose by allowing them to do it; that nearly all neutral states, the United States in particular, are dependent upon the English merchant marine, English exchange, English insurance, for economic contact with three-fourths of the globe; that the geologic contour of the European coast, the ocean currents, and the position of the British Isles compel the commerce of the world with northern Europe to pass through the English Channel which England's harbors, for the same geologic reasons, control."

One rubs one's eyes.

Here are Great Britain and her allies, by their own repeated avowal, in an all but desperate position. They have again and again declared that their very existence is threatened; they are at this moment straining every nerve to secure the help of even minor Balkan states, not a few military critics declaring that the outcome of the war will depend upon the action of those states. However that may be, however slim the chance, that is, that Germany is likely to overcome the Western Allies, there is no visible prospect of their achieving what we have so often been told is the real object of the war: such a conquest of Germany as to reduce her military power to impotence and make it impossible for her ambitions ever again to disturb the world. If that, or anything resembling it, is ever to be achieved by the means that the Allies are now employing, it will mean a long drain upon resources that are already strained—as the present very serious credit difficulties of Great Britain show—resources which, without the United States to draw upon, would be obviously unequal to the task.

The proposal under discussion is that at this very critical juncture the United States should intervene and say to Great Britain: In order to secure a more effective coöperation of the world against a common menace, we will not only sacrifice what we believe to be our rights to very valuable trade with neutrals and with Germany, which, if insisted upon, would greatly add to the difficulty of your task; but we will also make arrangements concerning our trade and finance in the future which may render possible what your unaided efforts seem unlikely to accomplish, namely, the removal of a menace which you say threatens your existence. Such coöperation on our part involves, in fact, placing our national resources at your disposal for your present purpose and may involve on America's part great sacrifices of trade and profit over very long periods; this sacrifice will be obviously a valuable, possibly a vital contribution to the achievement of your ultimate purpose, which from the first you have declared to be essential to your continued national existence.

And this, says Professor Usher, is no service at all on America's part, "no *quid pro quo* whatever"!

In submitting my proposal I made an assumption which I believe most Englishmen would make, namely, that "control of the sea" is something which England exercises, not for the purpose of imposing her domination, political or commercial, upon the world, but for securing England's safety (which they believe in the present circumstances involves the defeat of Germany) and the vindication of what Mr. Asquith has called "the public right of Europe." If the civilized world will make common cause with her in those objects, associating itself with her for the purpose of rendering more effective that isolation of Germany she is attempting to achieve by her sea power; and, if the necessity of defeating Prussian military aggression should demand it, for the purpose also of completing and prolonging that isolation to a degree and in a way which her unaided sea domination could never do, why, in the name of all the professions with which she entered this war, should England object? Professor Usher seems to write as though the plan involved some surrender of England's power to her enemies; but it means increasing that power over her enemies by the addition of an economic ally and the prolongation into the *post bellum* period, by the consent of her allies, of blockade and contraband arrangements. What Professor Usher suggests is that when virtually the whole non-German world is prepared to tax its resources for the purpose of waging more effectively a war against a common enemy, England will stand out for controlling the employment of that instrument, not for the common purpose, but for her own advantage as against that of her allies. I do not believe that she could if she would, or would if she could. For, while it is true that England's allies and the United States may be dependent upon her in the way Professor Usher suggests, it is also true that England is very much dependent financially and industrially just at present upon the United States—a circumstance which Professor Usher's survey of the factors does not include. When he tells us that international coöperation of this kind is impossible because England would be in a position to defy the decision of her partners by virtue of her preponderant sea power, he surely overlooks the fact that those partners, notably the United States, have the disposal of things—ammunition, food, supplies, money—essential to rendering even sea power effective. The real situation is one of the interdependence with the balance as between England and the United States rather remarkably just now against Great Britain.

Professor Usher's criticism moreover seems to overlook the fact that if America joins the Allies in the ordinary way all the arrangements I have indicated will go into effect automatically during the period of the war. America in a state of war will take her own precautions to see that supplies, whether of cotton or of anything else do not reach Germany; this country will also presumably enter into some sort of consultation with her allies as to the most effective form of her coöperation in the war that they would be waging in common: whether for instance her energies should go mainly into the furnishing of supplies, ammunition, money, etc. This country would have to decide what proportion of the output of munitions and supplies would be needed for her own military purposes, and that would involve the control of exports. Obviously there can be no real and effective division of labor be-

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tween the Allies in these circumstances without consultation and agreement as to such matters, and to others like the furnishing of supplies to neutrals. Would England still insist that her allies had no part in controlling those arrangements, and that such control must remain a prerogative of her absolute dictation secured through sea power? In short, would not the mere fact of America's joining the Allies bring about just those international arrangements concerning the destination of American supplies, etc., which in effect mean the internationalization of sea control?

What my suggestion amounted to was this: that since internationalization of sea control would be inevitable during the period of the war anyhow, if America became one of the combatants, this country could secure England's coöperation in a plan which may give the nations as a whole a better instrument for the restraint of a recalcitrant member than military force, exercised as it has been in the past, seems to be.

England's coöperation therein would in no wise weaken British sea power as a defensive instrument, for a condition of its internationalization would be the coöperation of all of those who shared its control in British defence. The world as a whole under such an arrangement would stand for British integrity as much as it would stand for Belgian, and if the plan is workable at all British security would gain and not lose.

What Professor Usher's objection comes to is that England desires to retain her control of the seas, not as a defensive instrument, but as one for securing special advantage over other nations. To which I would reply that it cannot in practice be so used; and that if it could, and England does so attempt to use it to the disadvantage of others, she is destined one day to occupy the position that Germany does to-day. Rather than that, I believe that Englishmen as a whole would, if the facts were clear, infinitely prefer some such international arrangement as the one I have indicated.

NORMAN ANGELL.

NEW YORK CITY.

CORRESPONDENCE

A Better Way of Representation

SIR: I think that your readers will be interested in the news that for the first time in the United States or Canada a public body is to be elected by proportional representation. Ashtabula, Ohio, adopted the proportional method for the election of its council of seven members on August 10th.

The Hare system of proportional representation has been successfully in use for a number of years in Tasmania and South Africa. In Tasmania it elects the Provincial Assembly, in South Africa the Senate of the Union and the councils of cities in the Transvaal. The same system is prescribed also by the Home Rule Act for the Senate and some thirty-one members of the House to be established in Ireland. A system essentially the same has long been used for the election of the Senate of Denmark. Other systems of proportional representation are used with satisfaction for parliamentary or municipal elections, or both, in a number of other countries, including Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland, and some of the states of Germany.

Under this system the majority of the seats in the council are sure to be won by a majority of the voters of the city, and yet no minority that can poll approximately a seventh of the votes—supposing there are seven seats—will fail to win one seat. The experience of the several countries where proportional representation is in use shows that true representation of the various interests and opinions of the community is necessary, not only in the interests of justice, but in those of harmony and stability. The first introduction of the system in Switzerland, indeed, was due to the breaking out of civil strife there on account of the failure of the old majority system to give a large group of the voters their fair share of representatives.

Monsieur L. Dupriez, Professor of Comparative Constitutional Law in the University of Louvain, who is temporarily a member of the faculty of Harvard, writes:

> The first and indispensable condition of the good organization of the government of a city is " to insure before all things a constant and internal control in municipal commissions by bringing into them men of diverse origin and tendencies." I believe that a commission or municipal council elected exclusively on the principle of plurality or majority cannot constitute a good city government. Such a commission or council will understand, protect, and favor only the interests, desires, and points of view of the group that elected it. It will neglect, or even perhaps oppose, the interests, desires, and aspirations of the beaten minorities. Besides, in such an assembly of associated friends the absence of all control will permit every abuse to develop. These dangers and disadvantages will be found not only if the municipal elections are carried out and dominated by the national parties, but also if they are fought out between groups constituted on lines purely municipal.
>
> But if municipal commissions and councils are composed of men nominated by diverse groups, which represent diverse ideas and points of view and which defend interests that are different or even opposed, each of the members will exercise an effective and vigilant control over the others.

Those who want to see the way opened for the introduction of the proportional system in New York when public opinion is ripe for it should exert their influence at once on the Committee on Suffrage of the Constitutional Convention. It was to that committee that the proposed amendment making the proportional system constitutional was referred. Unless the friends of the cause make their influence felt with the committee at once, I presume the amendment wil be tabled—if, indeed, it has not met that fate already.

C. G. HOAG,

American Proportional Representation League, Haverford, Pa.

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After the Play

IN the second act of "Common Clay", given for the first time in New York last week at the Republic Theatre, Judge Samuel Filson is sitting in his law office. Through the windows on your left you look down upon the city, "any large American city in the Middle West," and upon a river. Enter Richard Fullerton, Judge Filson's old friend. Fullerton's distress is acute. He is face to face with what used to be called "the almost inevitable consequences" of his son Hugh's intrigue with Ellen Neal, a maid at the Fullertons'. Ellen says Hugh is her child's father. Richard Fullerton wants Judge Filson to buy her off. Yes, says the Judge, that can be arranged. But is there no other way out? Suppose Hugh were to marry Ellen? To enforce this suggestion, which has sent the bewildered and outraged Fullerton up into the air, Judge Filson reveals the secret of his life. Twenty years ago, when the Judge was making his first campaign for Congress, his mistress told him she was with child. She had not been a "good woman," Dolly Montrose, when he fell in love with her, several years earlier, but she was true to him, she loved him. He asked her to marry him, but Dolly, knowing that such a wife as she would maim him as a lawyer and kill him as a politician, refused. Rather than risk his future by letting their secret out she drowned herself.

At about this point in Judge Filson's story, told with feeling and grave naturalness by Mr. John Mason, a low, vile, base, unmentionable suspicion sneaked into my mind. Could it be, was it possible, that Judge Filson was mistaken in thinking his child dead, that she was alive, that she was Ellen Neal? Such a suspicion was unworthy to live. I caught it and wrung its neck. How could it have gumshoed its way into my head? Why, the whole second act, written with such an eye for character, unfolding by sudden lifelike turns into something unforeseen and natural, proved that Mr. Cleves Kinkead, the author of "Common Clay," wasn't that kind of author. Besides, didn't Dolly Montrose's last letter say that her unborn child would die when she died? And didn't the programme guarantee the appearance in a later act of Mrs. Neal, obviously Ellen's mother? But suppose Dolly had deceived Filson, and had borne her child before killing herself? . . . Nonsense. My first reason for trustfulness was the solidest. The whole second act proved Mr. Kinkead too good an observer of life to deal in such wares. He was clearly not the kind of playwright that hides a child for twenty years and then throws her at a remorseful father and a stricken audience.

Well, although this thing, which I suspected him of, withdrawing my suspicion the next moment and blushing for myself, is the very thing Mr. Kinkead has done in "Common Clay," I still don't think him that kind of author. Of course, I have to admit that Ellen is Judge Filson's daughter, whose mother bore her not long before committing suicide, and handed over with a sum of money to the Neals. Nor can I deny that "Common Clay" seems first to have occurred to Mr. Kinkead as the story of Judge Filson and his illegitimate daughter, supposedly-never-born. But I maintain that the Mr. Kinkead who dug this subject out of the ash can was not the Mr. Kinkead who wrote the second act of "Common Clay" and a good deal of the third. Look at the evidence: Hugh Fullerton, father of Ellen's baby, is not her first lover. In a play by Mr. Kinkead No. 1 such a discovery would lighten Hugh's load and throw upon Ellen the burden of remaining "sympathetic." Ellen's first lover would be eternally damned. This seducer, a friend of Hugh, Artie Coakley, whose acquaintance we made in the first act, when he was drunk as usual, would swell to the dimensions of a villain. Nothing of the sort. Coakley tells us, with sincerity and a kind of loyalty to Ellen, exactly how it happened. He is very sorry, especially for himself. Mr. Kinkead enables us to realize Coakley as absurd, not unlikable, one of those youngsters who mean no harm and do much.

Law of play by kind of playwright who habitually goes where Mr. Kinkead went for the subject of "Common Clay": When we think a little better of Hugh, because he wasn't Ellen's first seducer, and a little better of Coakley, because we understand how it happened, we are bound to think somewhat worse of Ellen. But the real Mr. Kinkead, not the Mr. Kinkead who chose his subject, doesn't try to put over any such third-rate stuff. Listen to Ellen telling in the third act, with Miss Jane Cowl's moving voice and suffering eyes, her story in court. No, nothing of the kind would probably have befallen her if she had kept away from Bender's dance hall. She tells why she didn't keep away. What a picture it is of Ellen outside the Neals' cottage, on a warm evening, looking now through the windows at the Neals' blank, sordid present and her own blank, sordid future, and now at the road leading away, under the stars, to the fresh country, and youth in the open, and joy! The natural food of youth—that was all her youth craved, and for her, as for so many other girls, the easiest way of satisfying this hunger led to Bender's dance hall. What an easy, natural way it was! How well we understand Ellen!

After Ellen's story is over Mrs. Neal takes the witness stand. Before she leaves it everybody knows that Dolly Montrose was Ellen's mother. Judge Filson alone knows that he is her father. Exeunt all except the Judge and Ellen, and the play and the Judge and Ellen and Mr. Kinkead go down, down, down. I don't like to think Mr. Kinkead wrote the rest of the third act, but I believe he did. Indeed, lifelike touches here and there are plainly by the hand that wrote act second. But the epilogue? Ten years later—Ellen famous singer in opera—Hugh reeking with civic virtue, his private life blighted by failure to find Ellen—reunited—who could have written this imbecile epilogue? Not Mr. Kinkead, of course. Not the man who wrote act second or the early part of act third. Not the man who threw in, to give us good measure, the lawyer that Mr. Robert McWade plays so vividly.

All this sounds like an *ex parte* assertion that long-lost children shouldn't be admitted into self-respecting plays. But that is not quite what I mean. I have read a play in which a child, supposed to be dead, grows up, kills his unknown father in a row, marries his unknown mother, and lives with her about twelve or seventeen years before either of them suspects the truth. And it was a good play, although, as Mr. Gilbert Murray says, "the supposition that Oedipus has never inquired into the death of his predecessor on the throne" is an instance of "unsophisticated technique." My objection to Mr. Kinkead's subject is that almost no author can think out a real ending after such a start. Mr. Kinkead hasn't found any ending to speak of. But he has written an act and a half that explain why he got the Craig prize, and that he and Professor Baker have a right to be proud of. Q. K.

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Books and Things

AMONG pure aristagogues books about books still have a bad name. You still meet people, if you are not careful, who tell you they had rather read books than books about books. Such a general statement of this preference doesn't mean much. You had rather read the works of Shakespeare than what Mr. Hamilton Wright Mabie says about them? Of course. Who wouldn't? But would you rather read the works of Shakespeare than what Mr. Frank Harris says about them? Would you rather study the works of Samuel Johnson than what Boswell has to say about their author? Would you always rather study the works of God, passim, then read what Darwin has to say about them? Suppose you do maintain that you had rather read Shakespeare than Mr. Frank Harris on Shakespeare? My answer is easy. I begin by admitting that the amount of pleasure I've got out of Shakespeare is infinitely greater than the pleasure I've got out of Frank Harris. I go on to assert that I am free to read both. I conclude by asserting that reading Frank Harris has provoked me to reread Shakespeare and enabled me to read him more active-mindedly and with greater pleasure. To say that you never get anything out of books about books is one way of either admitting that your mind is too old to learn or of boasting that it is a self-starter.

About many living authors I have a good deal of curiosity. As to their lives, their habits, their methods of work, their opinion of themselves. What have you done to this curiosity when you've labelled it vulgar? You have certainly not extinguished it. You haven't lessened my desire to know whether Mr. Arnold Bennett, who thinks play writing easier than novel writing, sees any connection between this belief and the inferiority of "The Honeymoon," a play, to "The Old Wives' Tale," a novel. I still want to know whether Mr. Bennett would say it was harder to write "The Glimpse" than "Le Demi-Monde." As to Mr. H. G. Wells, vulgar curiosity makes me eager to learn in what degree, or whether in any degree, some of his later novels are apologiae pro vita sua. As for Anatole France, the first question I should ask, of anybody who knew him well enough and not too well to answer, would be this: Why has Anatole France's attitude toward love undergone such a change? Why, in every book written later than "Le Lys Rouge," does he almost never speak of love without derision?

Anatole France, H. G. Wells and Arnold Bennett are, as it happens, the subjects of the first three books in a series which Messrs. Henry Holt & Company have begun to publish. Each book is short, somewhere between fifteen- and twenty thousand words, each costs only fifty cents, and two of the three almost justify the publishers' description of the series: "Critical estimates of the works of famous authors and accounts of their lives, written while they are yet alive, and done, not by literary hacks, but by fellow-craftsmen of a younger generation distinguished for imaginative work." Even Mr. W. L. George, whose book on Anatole France is very bad, is anything but a literary hack. You wonder as you read why he thought he could write a book upon this subject. You wonder why the editor let George do it. Just listen to Mr. George's phrases: "Anatole France is seldom a good Catholic, except when he is chalking up on the cathedral wall: 'To hell with the Pope!'" ". . . as expressed by his characters, his conception of love is rather disgusting," . . . "the dapper quality of the great Frenchman's thought," . . . "born like a young rat in a bookcase," . . . "a rare bird." . . . "Selection is with him a habit, and that is why Anatole France will never be confounded with the Zolas, the Sudermanns and the William de Morgans." . . . This last sentence leaves one mildly desirous of learning what reason Mr. George would give for certitude that Voltaire will never be confounded with the Frank Norrises, the Sardous and the Walter Besants.

Mr. F. J. Harvey Darton's "Arnold Bennett" is as good as Mr. George's "Anatole France" is bad. It would be worth having even if it contained nothing but its note on the topography of the Five Towns, with map. Mr. Darton is rich in curiosity. He seems to have read Arnold Bennett's books with an alert, continuous wish to find out what Arnold Bennett is like. Everything he says is the result of his attempt to satisfy this wish. When he denies to Arnold Bennett any sensitiveness to "natural" beauty, he is only making room for an account of the qualities which delight him in Arnold Bennett, the "impersonal strength," the "miracle of constructive genius and eclectic self-restraint" which distinguishes "The Old Wives' Tale." Here and there you come across acute general statements, as this of the modern novel: "The characteristic achievement is controlled mass. Mr. Darton's book contains some revealing extracts from a privately printed journal kept by Arnold Bennett, in the third person, apparently: "The peril he most dreaded was idleness, and the sin of thinking without writing." That quotation explains a feeling one has about Arnold Bennett. Few authors of his rank appear to have done so little thinking and observing and feeling without writing. But the quotation doesn't, of course, explain why so little harm has been done to his talent by this risky refusal to waste time. To few novelists is it given both so obviously to use all their raw material and also to have so much left.

Mr. J. D. Beresford's "H. G. Wells" is a leit-motif book. He sees Wells "as regarding life from a reasonable distance." Wells is able to do this because of his birth and education, and because he wants to. This attitude explains many of his literary methods, of which the purpose is to get his readers into the same attitude. It explains why, in "Marriage," he ships Trafford and Marjorie off to Labrador: Mr. Wells wants them to look at life and at their lives from a certain distance. "In effect," says Mr. Beresford, "this is the same specific that I upheld in my comment on the romances; it illustrates . . . the overwhelming desire to see the movements and intricacies of human initiative and reaction from a momentarily detached standpoint." There is a fine contagious admiration in Mr. Beresford's book. He says of Wells in the concluding sentence: "His chief achievement is that he has set up the ideal of a finer civilization, of a more generous life that that in which we live."

Although Mr. Beresford's is not a book which is highly flavored with mind, it is worth reading because of its eagerness and generosity. Mr. Darton's tempts you to read nearly all of Arnold Bennett over again, examining Mr. Darton's positions in the light of a renewed familiarity, reconsidering many of your own. As an antidote to Mr. George it isn't necessary to read the whole of Anatole France. Almost any page will serve to take the Georgian taste away.

P. L.

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The Means and the End

Political Ideals, by C. Delisle Burns. London: Oxford University Press. 85 cents.

THIS is an interesting and very able little book. Mr. Burns has set out to examine the meaning of the ideals that each age, however materialistic, sets up before itself, and to determine, in some sort, their political value. He urges that the ideal is in fact an admirable index to the thought of the age, that, briefly, an age is what it desires. He brings much historical proof to the support of his argument.

It is a deeply interesting, if also deeply controversial position. There is a vast difference between the political pretensions of men and their realization in the event. At bottom, we have tended in historical work rather to judge by achievement than by intention. We have asked for the translation of ideals into very solid terms of effective political reality before we have signified approval. To Mr. Burns our procedure seems mistaken. The ideal determines the real. It is the dreamer to whom in the end the deeper significance belongs. The one great thing of permanent value, he seems to say, is political goodwill. Granted that only, our progress is certain.

Half of ethical history is in that argument. The best means, for our purpose, of considering it, is to discuss it in relation to the state. Now of that organization the end, as Aristotle urged, is the highest life, and good would seem to be adequately defined as action in accord with that end. So far we are in agreement with Mr. Burns. But, clearly, something more is needed. It is possible to perform an act perceived to be good of which the consequences are yet disastrous, as when charity results in pauperization. Politically, in that event, it would be impossible to make intention the pivot of our moral judgment. So to do would, for example, justify the whole history of religious persecution, which most of us think bad in its essence; yet, looking only at the motive of such persecution, no one would urge that it is not irreproachable. It seems entirely beneficent to save one's fellows from eternal damnation. Similarly, no one would, I think, honestly urge that England has treated Ireland well; and yet Hansard bears copious witness to the excellence of their ideal of Irish policy.

So that although our judgment is clearly concerned with intention, it is concerned with something else as well. A "good" statesman is something more than a man who has striven nobly. He is also a man whose policy has been attended by "good" consequences. The state, in its judgments, must regard results equally with intentions; on no other ground, surely, can we justify the execution of Strafford. If the motive of a statesman, the greatness of his ideal, alone makes his act good or bad, we have to accept the doctrine that the end justifies the means; a doctrine of which the history is written in letters of blood and fire. We do not accept it, simply because we find it subversive of the whole purpose of the state. We think of France in the latter half of the sixteenth century, of Europe in 1915, where no party had or has doubt of the greatness of its ideals. We look at the consequences of their certainty and see that they can transform the ideal into a hideous thing.

We are driven, then, to an objective test. We say that right conduct, the conduct, that is to say, which men ought to perform, is that which will be attended by the best possible consequences. It is, I think, inevitable that this should be the case. When John Bright opposed the Factory Acts, in the fifties of last century, no one doubted that his motives were excellent; but opinion is practically unanimous that he was wrong. He acted in a manner which his moral emotion might approve, but which his moral judgment should have shown him to be mistaken. It is only on this ground that it is possible to doubt the rightness of the militant suffragists. No one can deny that, emotionally, they deemed their actions to be just; the sole ground of controversy must be the consequences of their actions. It is not, so far as I can see, necessarily bad to burn down property; it is the consequences of burning it when weighed against the consequences of leaving it unburned that enables us to have a judgment of approval or of disapproval. So with regard to Home Rule. The action of Sir Edward Carson in raising an army to resist an act of Parliament can only be judged wrong if worse results would follow than from his acceptance of it. We appeal, in brief, to reason as of fundamental importance in any criterion of conduct. Great acts may, as Disraeli once claimed, spring from the passions, but they are the more important because the more enduring when we are rationally convinced of their truth. The most tragic mistakes of history have often come from following an ideal. It is not morally sufficient to mean well. It is necessary to think well also.

It is worth while noting that on such a view, we obtain a progressive theory of morality. Each age ought morally to advance upon its predecessors simply because it has a greater experience behind it. History, as Polybius said, is a storehouse of political instances; because it is the

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greatest metaphysic of personal experience it serves as a warning and a guide. From the point of view of intention, of ideal, there is little choice, for instance, between a benevolent despot and an efficient democracy. But history is the record of what has resulted from both these great political experiments, and it does not report in favor of tutelage. So that the man who aims, even from the highest motives, at Caesarism, is acting contrary to the best interests of the state. To anyone who reflects on the facts this conclusion becomes increasingly apparent. It is all very well for Mr. Chesterton to make his fervid appeal for a world which eats caviare on impulse; the truth nevertheless remains that the constitutions of most of us are not suited to the consumption of caviare.

That, barely and inadequately enough, seems to me the basis of the case against Mr. Burns' contention. We use ideals as relevant factors in the interpretation of each age but not as decisive factors. In so far as they are at all final they rest on the insufficient moral basis of goodwill. They do not lean on the facts; rather, they treat them with contemptuous scorn. We deem it better to go back to human nature; the men with their heads in the clouds neglect the pit beneath their feet. We judge them pragmatically. The truth of their ideal consists in the concrete difference it makes to human happiness. It is an inductive ethic maybe, one built slowly and painfully from the record of historic experience. It lacks much of the poetic splendor of the Utopians. Yet the splendor of truth, the splendor that results from the achievement of real things, is not without its appeal. In the long run, the significance attaches to the men who have thus dared to attach their dream to the event, to hope not for the best, but for the best possible. We shall not judge the Fathers by the Declaration of Independence. We shall have for modern Germany a criterion other than her hopes of spiritual propagandism. The soul of man may be big with yearning; his desires may well be, as Mr. Burns so eloquently urges, prophetic of an ultimate fruition. Yet no less certainly does the real test lie in his actual achievement.

HAROLD J. LASKI.

McLoughlin on Lawn Tennis

Tennis As I Play It, by Maurice E. McLoughlin. New York: George H. Doran Company. $2.00 net.

THIS is one of the most engaging of lawn tennis books. Mr. McLoughlin's plan is exactly disclosed in his title. His manner is descriptive, not dogmatic. He never implies that his own methods ought to be everybody's. He believes that in lawn tennis there are usually several ways of executing a stroke effectively, and that very rarely does any particular way deserve to be called the right one.

"In my view," he writes, "it rests with the player himself to determine what grip is the least tiring and gives him greatest control of the ball." He is often self-critical, as when he says: "At present my own backhand is quite inadequate. . . . I cannot control it properly when I hit it hard enough to be effective." In his cordial praise of other players one hears the expert's genuine delight in expertness.

From McLoughlin's own methods and those of his usual opponents one would be able to deduce certain opinions, and in this book you find them. The possessor of a service severe enough to pull the striker-out a couple of yards outside the side-line naturally does not believe very firmly in the center theory for the single game. Against the late Anthony Wilding, who did so much of his playing from the base-line, McLoughlin found the center theory "invaluable in enabling me at the net to reach his ground strokes." But against men who try to get to the net, as most of his opponents do, nothing is to be gained by habitually returning the ball down the center. What McLoughlin says about length will scandalize certain old stagers, but its truth is obvious: "Good length in ground strokes is worth cultivation, but when playing against sound aggressive net players one never gives very much thought to his length; then it is placement and keeping the ball low that figure most prominently. Length is only important when your opponent is in the back court."

Writing wholly upon the most modern game, Mr. McLoughlin writes primarily for volleyers called upon to play against volleyers. One cannot help regretting that difference in their ages has kept him from ever meeting S. H. Smith, whose success against American net players was greater than that of any other Englishman, not excepting H. L. Doherty. McLoughlin's remarks upon Smith's back court play, against which we believe he would have prevailed, would have been interesting reading. Here and there one finds a sentence which an older player, one who had played much against the Englishmen who flourished in the ten years about 1900, would hardly have written. To say of the Dohertys that "their own backhand was far from weak" is a little inadequate, particularly of R. F., whose backhand was exceptionally severe and gave one the impression that he could repeat his best shots as often as he pleased. In Wilding's opinion R. F. Doherty's backhand was fifteen better than any other stroke employed by either of the brothers.

The most useful parts of this book are naturally the chapters on the strokes in which the author is strongest, the service, the volley and the smash. Especially valuable to players young enough to learn is what Mr. McLoughlin says about the importance of follow-through to the volleyer: "The follow-through on the volley is only a matter of inches, yet in just this small but important feature hundreds of volleyers fail. Their volley stroke is in the manner of a poke—quick stabs here and there at the ball that carry no weight behind them because the racket is checked immediately on impact instead of the hand being allowed to go through in line with the ball's flight for the smallest fraction of a second after it is struck."

To Make Undergraduates Think

College and the Future, edited by Richard Rice, Jr. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. $1.20 net.

THE more progressive teachers of English in the American colleges are beginning to make it their business not only to supply the student with a miscellaneous collection of literary fragments and to coax him into the construction of grammatical sentences, but also to get him into the habit of absorbing actively the ideas which the literature presents. It is being discovered that young men will not learn to write until they have something to write about. And it is no longer the fashion to rely for composition themes upon athletic contests or sophomoric reactions to Beaumont and Fletcher. One way of getting college writing to be a reflection of intellectual processes is to organize the reading towards the definite end of polemics. Some professors make their English course a kind of guerilla warfare upon the great intellectual themes of the last half-century, cleverly picking out from the famous English and American writers essays which shall give opposing points of view, and so stimulate argument and kindle

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a blaze of something that must be said. I once attended the closing session of a freshman class in one of our large universities which was conducted by a devotee of this method. Free-will vs. determination, democracy vs. aristocracy, religion vs. science, peace vs. war, equal suffrage, capital punishment, had been voted upon at the beginning of the course, and now after a term of reading and discussion of selections from Huxley, Spencer, Mill, James, Morley, the final vote was to be taken to discover what it had all done to fertilize the minds. The election went off with much joviality and neatness, and showed a satisfactorily radical trend, but my contentment with the conversions was marred by suspicions of the value of a card-index conception of the field of intellectual issues. Such an enterprise was certainly a brave attempt to "teach the student to think." But it seemed more likely that the students were being paid in brass counters of thought, which they would find of little service in any real challenge to their opinions.

A far more hopeful way is to focus the ideas on the immediate environment, turn the white light of introspection on college life itself. Such a focussing Mr. Rice, an associate professor of English in Indiana University, has performed in this collection of "essays for the undergraduate on problems of character and intellect." They seem much better fitted than the slightly musty ideas of the great Victorians to "present a series of facts and opinions that will be naturally productive of further opinions and investigation on the student's part." Beginning with the concrete details of "Life at Oxford," the book runs through Woodrow Wilson's "What is a College For?" Simon Newcomb's "University Athletics," Meiklejohn, Roosevelt, Stevenson, and others, to the abstractions of Wells' "Discovery of the Future," and the striking "Great Analysis." Starting at the college gate, one finds one's self eventually at the "international mind." It is quite plausible that at least some idea in this varied collection will strike some kind of a spark from almost every type of college student. The difficulty with getting people to think is in convincing them that there is anything worth thinking about. If the usefulness of athletics does not produce some intellectual friction and heat, one can almost trust our American habits of self justification to make these several essays on the reasons for college ideals and endeavors the text for discussions that should draw whole shoals of freshmen into their nets.

In talking recently with a group of freshmen, I was asked what I thought of advertising as a profession. Their implications were all that in subtlety, utility and charm, this branch of human endeavor ranked with the cultivation of the sciences and the fine arts. I made small headway in convincing my friends that there was a difference. Here seemed to be some rudimentary work for the college. Certainly, unless it dislodges convictions like this, it will have rather laughably failed in its simplest task, that of giving those who come to it some sense of the relative values of things. A book like this ought to be as successful as anything in jolting severely these subterranean, esoteric cults of the modern undergraduate.

[CORRECTION. In our issue of August 28, page 106, the third sentence of the review "American Philosophy" should have read: "The distinction is generally ignored by philosophers, partly because of the limitations of the professional philosopher's range of interests, and partly because of the Hegelian tradition in which thought and philosophy are identical."]

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

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